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The Origin of the Spanish Question

The so-sal led **Spanish Question" arose because of
the eharaeter of the regime now in power in Spain.

Some

members of the United Hâtions have deelared that the ori
gin, habits, institutions and general conduct of the re
gime headed by Oeneral Franco are incompatible with the
principles of the Charter, and a result of this alleged
incompatibility, Spain has been refused admittance to
the United Nations.

One group of member states was con

vinced that the existence and activities of the Franco
regime created international friction.

However, the

United States expressed its opinion that the question
was not so important as it seemed.

With this idea in

mind. Secretary Acheson recently circulated a policy
letter in which he held that owing to organized propa
ganda and pressure, "the Spanish question has been magni
fied by controversy to a position among our present day
foreign policy problems which is disproportionate to its
intrinsic Importance."^

Nevertheless, evidence seems to

show that the matter is of great international concern.
Spain has been the cause of international tension
since the revolutionary birth of the Franco regime In
1936.

The revolution, called by Franco a "counter revo-

Department jst
P.rJtM.% Release. January 19,1950.
(text 5 r -£ W t Sr- T r ^ T s ê e r S w y 'ieheion
Achf
to sinator'Tom
Oonnally, January 19, 1960.)

lution«”

on July 14, 193#, when a email group

of the e m ^ seize# the government redlo etmtlon In the
oity of Veleneie*^

It took three years for Freneo to

oonsolidate hla position, tout toy the spring of 1939 it
sea generally aooepto# that Franoo was master of Spain,
and some states, inoluding the United States and Cireat
Britain, aoeorded him offlolal reoognltion.
By 1939, too, the League of Nations was drawing
its last toreath, end if the United Nations sen be sailed
the ohild of the League, then the **Spanlah Question" is
part of its inheritanse.

The Spanish problem was first

brought to the attention of the League in July, 193#.
At this time the League of Nations was in an unfortun
ate oonditlon.

The ineffeetual bmndllng of the "China

Inoidant" and the Bthlopian affair had severely damaged
the League's reputation.

Now it was faced with perhaps

an even more difficult situation.

Now could the League

protect Reputolioan Spain, protoably its firmest support
er, and at the same time confine the conflict to Spain?^
® Norman J. Padelford,

smsL la

§BAalab £1x11 Ian* i*

m l MlülSr

3
In Article 6 of the Spanish Republlcsn Constitu
tion, the Republic endorsed the Paris Peace pact; Arti
cle II prohibited the President from declaring war ex
cept under conditions laid down by the League Covenant.

M A A N m S£. £aU.^l9&l SSlâûSft,

The League, as the United Nations later, had trouble
determining on what grounds It could claim jurisdiction.
The Covenant of the League did not mention civil war, and
It recommended that Its member states and the League organ
izations refrain from Interfering In the domestic problems
of individual states.

However, Articles 3 and 4 of the

Covenant permitted the League to deal with any "matter
affecting the peace of the world," and Articles 10, 11,
12 and 16 gave It jurisdiction over any matter threaten
ing international peace and over any dispute likely to
4
lead to war.
In the circumstances, the League of Nations
apparently had the right officially to Intervene In the
Spanish Civil War.
Six times during the course of the Civil War, the
Spanish Republican government brought the Spanish prob
lem to the attention of the League of Nations*
publican argument never changed:

The Re

the war In Spain had

become an International war. Franco's rebellion was sup
ported from the outside, and the Non-Intervention Accord
of August, 1936 amounted to active Intervention on the
part of the members of the Accord against the Republican
government*

To support these charges, the Spanish dele

gation produced documents and photographs proving German
and Italian intervention In Spain, including the famous
^ Padelford, on. cit.. 181.

The RepubXiean government urged the League to apply
eanotiona ag^inet Italy and Germany to compel these two
powers to withdraw their forces from Opain, but the League
merely eadoraed the Non-Intervention Accord end the peace
efforts of Great Britain and i^rsnce.®

i epubllcan Spain

was able to secure only two votes for Its propoeal, thoae
of itself and the Soviet Union.
The League of Rations side-tracked action proposed
the Spanish Republican government, usually at the insist
ence of Great Britain and France wirio wanted to move care
fully "in view of the international s i t u a t i o n . T o w a r d s
the end of the Civil tar, on October 1, 1938, the League
did adopt resolutions offering the technical services of
the League to relieve the sufferings of the civilian popu
lation on both sides in Spain and setting up a consDission
This White Book made Mussolini very angry, not be
cause it established the proof of Italian intervention
which he admitted, but because it revealed the poor mor
ale and the cowardice of Italian soldiers.
It proved
many eases of bandaged soldiers with no wounds, selfinflicted wounds, and wounded soldiers being over-escorted
from the battlefield.
Shortly after the publication of
the White Book new army regulations were adopted by the
Italian High Command in r>pain to punish Italian soldiers
guilty of these crimes.
^ Padelford,
^ Ibid., 188.

op

.cit. . 188.
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to suporvlse tho "withdrawal plan."8
Altogether the League of Nations failed to protect
Republican Spain* but in justice to the League it should
be remembered that it was never asked to intervene direct
ly in the war but merely to curtail foreign aid to the
rebels*

In the League * as later in the United Nations*

the Soviet Union and the western Allies were divided over
the Spanish question*

The Soviet Union wanted to adopt

whatever measures were necessary to protect Republican
Spain* while the Allies favored a more cautious course*
(This was the period in which Ureat Britain end Prance
were trying to court favor with Italy* as a possible de
fense against Uermany.)
O
Premier Negrin of Republican Spain had announced the
decision of the Loyalist government to effect the with
drawal of all foreign volunteers from its armed forces
and had asked the League to supervise the withdrawal.
On
October 1* 1938* the Council adopted a resolution author
izing the creation of an international commission to note
the measures of withdrawal adopted by the Spanish govern
ment and the effectiveness of these measures.
In its res
olution the Council stated that the League "does not assume
any responsibility either for the method of withdrawal or
for the destination given to the persons withdrawn." The
Council* rather than appoint the members of the Commission
directly, authorized the representatives of Great Britain,
Prance, and Iran to select the Commission and be responsible
for its dispatch to Spain* The membership was composed of
General Jalander of Finland* Lieutenant Colonel Homo of
Prance* and Colonel Molesworth of Great Britain. The Com
mission assembled on the Spanish border on Octobur 14* 1938,
and proceeded to Barcelona where it began to oversee the
withdrawal of foreign troops via Perpignan*
Padelford, on. cit.. 140.

6

With the fall of Madrid, the League completely discard*
ed the Spanish question, end In May, Franco withdrew
Spain from the League of Nations.
May, 1939 was the last time the Spanish question re
ceived the attention of the League.

In September, 1939,

came the Invasion of Poland and the beginning of World
War II, a war that led to the creation of that "Grand
Alliance" which was one day to create the United Nations.
In a series of declarations, the members of this anti
fascist coalition indicated their intention of forming
a new world organization at the end of hostilities.

But

these declarations (the Atlantic Charter, the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals, and the Tehran Declaration) made no men
tion of the Franco regime, the same regime this coali
tion effectively barred from the United Nations three
years later.

The obvious reason for this ommlsslon was

that during the first years of World War II the Allies
considered It to be a matter of military expediency to
keep Spain neutral, emd an open condemnation of the
Franco regime would have defeated this purpose.
As World War XI drew to a close and victory for the
Allies seemed more certain. Allied policy towards Franco
became more outspoken.

At the United Nations Organiza

tional Conference in Sam Francisco, during the discussion

of the membership provlslo»» of the Charter by the Ooheral Provisions Committee, the Spanish question reappeared.
On June 18, 1946, Eollin of Belgium, the president of
the Oeneral Provisions Gommlttee, called for diacussiori
on Paragraph 6, Article 2, of the Charter which stated
that:
Membership of the Organization is open to all peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained
in the Charter and which. In the judgement of the g
Organization, are able and ready to carry them out.
Luis Qulntllla, the Mexican delegate, reminded the committee
of the views already expressed by the Mexican government
on the Spanish question.

10

Qulntllla made it clear that

Mexico would accept this article only with the understand
ing that it would exclude the defeated Axis governments
and the governments Imposed on other nations by the arm
ed forces of the Axis.

He specifically mentioned Man-

^ Documents a L thfl United Mations Oonference
International Organization. Vl T l T .
At the Conference of Chapultepec In February,
1946, Mexico had tried to persuade the hatin-Amerlean
states to present a united front against the Franco
regime at the San Francisco Conference, but the LetinAmerlcan states failed to agree upon the subject. The
Spanish Embassy claimed in 1947 that the failure of the
Mexican Government at the Conference of ^hapultepec was
a victory for Franco. The Spanish Embassy claimed tiiat
"the American nations were faithful to the doctrine of
non-intervention and to Its founders.
Ho amount of red
booty stolen from Spain could change the attitude of PanAmerican delegates. America remained loyal to Monroe,
Polk, Juarez and Marti." "How Russia uses the United
Nations Against Spain". Wheels Within Wheels. Spanish
Embassy, 1947.

8

ehuria, Japanese-controlled Chine, and Spain.

The Mexi

can delegate explained hie position by declaring that:
There wee a time while the costly fight was going
on, when some of the powers directly concerned with
the military conduct of the war placed-- or should
I say, had to place-- practical reasons of security
above logical conmitments, but fortunately through
the untold sacrifices of the great nations compris
ing this Oonference, the war in Europe is won. Musso
lini is no more, and Hitler himself has disappeared.
We can at long last speak uncompromisingly.
In other words, an open condemnation of Franco Spain
would not now endanger the course of military operations.
Qulntllla supported his accusations by reading telegrams
of congratulation from Franco to Hitler and finished his
denunciation with a ringing plea that Franco’s voice
never be heard In United Hâtions Conference halls*
The Mexican resolution, though it named no speci
fic nations and stated that membership in the United
Hâtions was not open to those states whose regimes had
been established with the help of Axis military forces,
18
was nevertheless partly aimed at Franco Spain.
Eight
11
12

Documents

st the

United M ê l ons CoaOtreng^
VI, IS).

m

%B-

This resolution declared:
"It is the understand
ing of the Delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of the
Chapter III cannot be applied to the states whose regimes
have been established with the help of military forces
belonging to the countries which have waged war agslnst
the United Hâtions, as long as those regimes are in power.
(Ibid., 20)

9

nations spoke in favor of the Mexican resolution.

13

Their

support ranged in intensity from that of the Belgian dele
gation, which merely voiced its approval, to that of the
Soviet Union, which claimed that Franco had actively aid
ed the other Axia powers in the slaughter "of millions of
14
innocent, peaceful inhabitants*"
The resolution was
adopted by a unanimous vote and was inserted in the Commission’s report. Adopted by the San Francisco Conference
on International Organization, the Mexican resolution
was the first international action taken on the Spanish
question since 1939.
In June, 1945, international attention was diverted
from the San Francisco Conference to the coming Berlin
Conference (Potsdam) of the "Big Three."

Pro-Republican

and anti-Franco forces saw a chance to further their
cause against the Franco regime.

They organized pressure

groups end propaganda, and in July "The Friends of the
Spanish Republic," a combination of liberals. Communists,
and pro-Bepublican forces in the United States, sent Mr.
^ 13
Ibid. . 26.
(These nations were France, Australia,
Belgium, the Ukrianlan Soviet Socialist Republic, the Bye
lorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the United States,
Uruguay, Chile, and Sweden.)
Ib id., 2 T .

10

Trumen a wlra urging that the Berlin Conference be used
as an occasion for joint action on Spain by the "Big
Three,
The Conferences, held at the Celelllenhof Palace
near Potsdam between July 17 and August S. 1946, were
attended by the heads of the governments of Great Bri
tain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Oeorges
Bidault of Prance and Wang Shlh-Ghleh of China were In
vited to sit In on the meetings.

The main aim was the

reaching of an agreement on the outstanding political and
economic problems left In the wake of the European war.
In due time, the Spanish question was brought up by Stalin,
and the three governments agreed upon the following declar
ation:
The three Governmenta, so far as they are concerned,
will support applications for membership from those
states which have remained neutral during the War,
and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.
The three Governments fe#l bound, however, to make
It plain that they for their part, would not favor
any application for membership put forward by the
present Spanish Government, which, having been
founded with the help of t ^ Axle Powers, does
not. In view of Its origins. Its nature. Its record
and Its close association with the aggressor states,
possess the Qualifications necessary nb justify such
membership.lb
"The Shape of Things,"

The Ration. July 14, 1946,

161.
"Spain,"

American Year Book. 1946. 113.

XI

This dselaratlon «as the first offioiaX aetlon taken
by the now vietorious Allies speelfieally to oondemn the
Spanish regime, and antl-Franoo forses assumed that if
this estIon were followed by a break in diplomatie rela
tions with Spain that Franso would be thrown out by the
Spanish people*

The western Allies, however, hesitated

at that time to take more severe astion, probably fearful
of another Spanish civil war*
Both the San Franeisoo Conference and the Potsdam Con
ference led to great activity in the Pardo Palace where
Franco called a meeting of his top advisers to discuss these
"outrages*"

Apparently it was there decided that the solu

tion ts Franco’s problem would be to Camouflage the real
character of the regime by convincing the world that Spain
war undergoing a democratic reformation*

Indeed, Spanish

propaganda had already been dedicated to this end sftnce
IV
T-B day*
Later, in 1946, the Spanish Embassy directly
attacked the San Francisco Resolution and claimed that:
hany of the delegations arriving for the Conference
came from war-torn countries; these were passing
through difficult internal trials which distorted
what might have been a dispassionate outlook* The
San Francisco Conference was marked by partiality,
by deep dislikes and war-born hatreds, by resent
ment and vengennse which at times was painfully
obvious to the outsider*
m

if.» 114*

"How Russia uses the Onited Nations against Spain,"
Wheels IJj£jaAli Wheels. 6*

18

Spain has ainca assarted that at San Pranelaeo Internation
al law was replaced by "a misuse of power” at the insistence
of the Soviet Union and its satellites and that the Oharter
is now nothing but a gigantic treaty of alliance against
the non-member states.
The Franco government gave a similar defense to the
accusations of the Potsdam Declaration*

The Spanish claimed

that Attlee was influenced ”by the electoral propaganda still
rife in England” and that the Spanish problem was b r c m ^ t to
the council table by *Blg Chief Stalin.”

Even so, the Pots

dam Declaration worried the Franco government enough to
cause it to issue the following answer to the

charges:

Considering the unwarranted reference to Spain
in the communique of the big three conference
in Berlin, the Spanish State denies, as being
both arbitrary and unjust, these references
and considers them as having been caused by
the propaganda campaign of the Red exiles and
their foreign collaborators.^^
Even though the Potsdam Conference had dealt Franco a severe
blow, the condemnation by the Big Three was not enough to
bring about his overthrow*
The action against Franco in Berlin was followed by the
Conference of Faria, called by Great Britain in August, 1945,
to consider the "Tangier Problem.”

Before World War II, the

area of Tangier had been governed by an International Com
mission made up of Spain, Great Britain and France.

In

13

Jun« of 1940, however, Spaoieh troops had oeoupled the
zone, and before the year was out Spanish laws were in
foree throughout the area.

Oreat Britain and Pranoe,

though foroed to reoognize the Spanish oeeupation as da
facto for the duration of the war, had refuaed to recog
nize it as

jure, and the United States gave it no recog

nition w h a t s o e v e r . A t the end of the war, the time had
C(me to settle accounts with Franco on this issue. Apparent
ly Great Britain had hoped that the Soviet Union would re-*
main a mere spectator, but when invitations to the Confer
ence of Paris were sent, the Soviet Union insisted upon a
seat at the Conference table*

Spain was to have been in

vited but upon Russian demand was excluded.
The Conference, held in Paris from August 10 to August
31, 1946, was attended by the representatives from the
Soviet Union, Pranoe, Great Britain and the United States.
On September 4, the United States Department of State an
nounced that three resolutions had been adc^ted: first,
that Spain was to evacuate Tangier at once ; second, that
the sovereign rights of the Sultan of Morocco in the area
around the city were to be restored; and third, that for
a period of six months there would be a provisional Inter20 mInternational Affairs," Newsweek.

July 16, 1945,

21 «Squeeze on Franco," Time. September 3, 1945, 25.

14

national Commimaion sat up using tha pra-war ooauaission
as a modal, and aomposad of tha sama mambare as tha pre
war aommission; and at tha and of this six month period
a new sonfaranoa would mast whieh would inoluda Spain among its mambars*

Tha Soviet Union, and perhaps the other

mambars of tha Oonfaranoa of Paris, thought that within
six months they would ba dealing with Franoo*s suoeassor,
hanea tha inclusion of Spain in tha invitations#

go

Tha six month period passed, and Franoo was still very
mush at the head of tha Spanish government, and no new oonfaransa was called#

There was, however, another moral con

demnation of the Franco regime by the western Allies.

The

United States, Franca, and Great Britain issued a joint
declaration on March 4, 1940, which clarified their policy
towards Franco S p a i n # T h e

declaration stressed two points:

first, that tha governments of the three countries agreed
that as long as General Franco continued in control in Spain,
tha Spanish people "could not anticipate full and cordial
relations with tha contracting parties;" and second, that
the governments of the three countries had not intended to
interfere in the internal affairs of Spain#

The three

governments declared that the Spanish people must work
22

.

86

o*a
23
Department s L State Press Release. No. 161, March 4,
1946, 1

15

eut their own destiny and that they were opposed to any
measure whleh might provoke another revolution in Spain*
They expressed their hope that:
In spite of the present regime’s repressive measures
against orderly efforts of the Spanish people to
organise and give free expression to their politisai
aspirations, the three (Governments are hopeful that
the Spanish people will not again be subjeeted to
the horrors and bitterness of civil strife*
The declaration also expressed the hope that the Franco re
gime would sollapse peasefully*
The Prensh then closed their frontier to all Spanish
traffie, and Franco countered by sending his Moorish troops
to the Pyrenees*

The French government was forced to this

decision by the pressure of public opinion*

French labor

unions refused to work on any trains which crossed the
Spanish border and held anti-Franco demonstrations over
Franco's execution^ of some well-known Republican leaders.
The Spanish government warned the French government that
a break in diplomatic relations would cut off the flow of
vitally needed Spanish supplies to France.

The French

government was careful to assure the Spanish that the clos
ing of the border was not meant to be an unfriendly act and
that the French government had been forced to close the
frontier by domestic pressure*
2“ Ibid.. 1.
2® "Th* International Sasne," Mawawaak. keroh 11, 1946,
42#
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These ^three eondemnatione (the San Praneiaoo Heaolution» the Potsdam Declaration# and the Three Power Joint
Deelaration hy Dreat Britain» the United States# and Pranoe)
were the only multi-lateral measuree taken against the Praneo regime before the question was brought before the newly
organised United Hationa*
'i

But these three dealarations

.

served as a guide to regulate the relations of the United
i

Rations with Spain*
At the time the iSpanish problem was introduoed before
the United Nations# only twenty-two nations maintained dixloamtio relations with Spain.

These states# which includ

ed the western Allies# favored a more eautious poliey to
ward Franoo Spain than did the states that had broken off
diplomatie relations with Spain*

The policy of the western

Allies was at all times modified by the fear of another civil
war in Spain# a fear probably prompted by eoneern over the
8d Argentina
Belgium
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Denmark
Dominiearn Republic
mire
ml Salvador
Oresee

The Netherlands
Norway
Peru
France
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United States
Uruguay
United Kingdom

(Report of the Special Sub-0ommittee on the Spanish Question#
SaiJiUl
agflclal
st
security Oouncll. 36. )
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possible fate of their eoonomlo Interests as well as by
a desire to spare the Spanish people the horrors of anoth
er elvll w a r . T h e

Soviet Union seemed to have been more

Interested In upsetting the Franco regime than In sparing
the feelings of the Spanish people.
These three pre-Unlted Nations declarations^ the Pots
dam Declaration# the San Francisco Resolution# and the
Three Power Joint Declaration, showed, at least, that the
western Allies and the Soviet Union were In accord about
one matter: that Franco Spain should not become a member
of the United Nations*
^ The American textile Interests In Barcelona# and the
Sngllah mining Interests (Rio Tlntc) would be definitely
dlsrtqpted by another civil war. The gains of the American
controlled telephone company In Spain# acquired through the
wartime pinch of the oil flow, would be threatened by a
civil war. A ccMsplete leftist victory might well bring
the nationalization of all foreign Industries as In the
Soviet Union, or partial nationalization as la Mexico and
Iran. Another civil war would probably lead to Interven
tion by both sides and might well be the start of World
War III.

18

Chapter II*

Introduetlon of the Spanish Question
to the United Nations

These earlier statements of polley ( the Potsdam Deei

, 1

;

.

laratlon, the San Pranelaeo Resolution* and the Three Power
■

:

.

^

■

r i

.V-*

I

■

•

\

- i t

Joint Deelaration of Great Britain, the United States* and
Pranee) had proved l^at the Allies neither favored the Franco
I

!

^

regime nor (In 1946) its admlttanee to the United Nations.
The memory of the part played hy Spain In World War II seemed
likely to prevent It from joining the oommunlty of nations.
Moreover* the relations between the Soviet Union and the
western Allies had not yet beeome strained to the point
where Great Britain and the United States would look upon
Franoo Spain as a potential ally.
The United Nations Itself excluded Franoo Spain from
membership at Its first meeting In London.

In February *

1946* In the twenty-sixth meeting of the General Assembly*
the Spanish question was Introduoed to the United Nations.
On February 9* 1946* the delegation from Panama proposed
a draft resolution on the relations of member nations with
Spain.

The resolution as passed by the General Assembly

read:
The General Assembly recalls:
That the San Franeisoo Oonferenoe adopted a reso
lution aooordlng to which paragraph B of Article
4 of Chapter II of the United Nations Charter can
not apply to states whose regimes have been In
stalled with the help of armed forces of countries

19

whioh have fought agaiaet the United Nations so
long as those regimes are in power*
The General Assembly reealls:
That at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of
the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that
they would not support a request for admission
to the United Nations of the present Spanish
Government *vhish having been founded with the
support of the Axis powers. In view of its origin,
its nature, its record, end its close association
with the aggressor states' does not posses the
necessary qualifications to justify its admission*
The General Assembly, In endorsing these two state
ments, recommends that the Members act in accord
ance with the letter and spirit of these statements
in the conduct of their future relations with Spain.1
Nine nations spoke in favor of the motion: Mexico, the
United States, France, Yugoslavia, Norway, Venezuela, the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the United Kingdom,
and Csechoslovakia.

The most vehement speech was given by

one of the Soviet bios*

Kuzma Sialev of the Byelorussian

Soviet Socialist Republic, referring to the activities of
the Blue Division, declared (technically incorrect) that
i

■

*

■

Franco Spain had been at war with his country and that
Spaniards had killed women and children, buriedl people
alive, and committed other atrocities*

When the measure

came up for vote, it received approval from all the members
except El Salvador and Nicaragua*

_
Genera A.ssem
February M

These two countries, who

20

professed friendship for the Franco regime, voted against
the resolution proposed by the delegation from Panama on
the grounds that it countenanced Intervention In the in
ternal affairs of Spain whieh the United Nations Charter
forbade*

The resolution, weak in not binding the members

of the United Nations in their relations with Spain, merely
reeommended that they follow the Potsdam and San Franeisoo
statements when dealing with the Franco regime*
A much stronger proposal than the Panama resolution was

introduced before the Security Council in April, 1946.

Dr.

Oscar Lange, the Polish representative, wrote the SecretaryGeneral on April 0, 1946, informing Trygve Halvdan Lie that
he had been instructed by his government to draw the atten
tion of the Security Council to a situation "of the nature
referred to in Article 34 of the C h a r t e r . T h i s situation.
s
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or
any situation which might lead to international friction
or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether
the contiusnce of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and se*
curity*
( G M E M r o£ m a Ur L ^ MS&ÂsmS
International Court of ^^btice: Department ofPubli c o n f o r 
mation, Lake Success, New York, 1946, Article 34, 16* Ar
ticles 36, 37, and 38 also give the Security Oouncll the
right to take action to preserve the maintenance of inter
national peace and security through peaceful methods. The
Oouncil may take coercive action under the authority of the
Oharter, by invoking the measures called for in Articles 39,
40, 41, 42, 43, and 44*)
Quote was taken from the United Nations Official Records of
JthSL Security SStiaall, Meetings
I M g * 491.

sa

aeeording to Lange, was "due to the Internatlonaa frietlon
resulting from the existence and activities of the Franco
regime in Spain.
On April 9, the Polish request that the Spanish ques
tion be placed on the agenda of the Security Council reach
ed the office of the Secretary-General.

The Polish govern

ment also referred to the Panama resolution and added that
the closing of the Spanish-French frontier had caused "in
ternational friction" by providing a cause for conflict
between Spain and Prance.^

The Polish government wanted

the United Nations to adopt measures which would lead to
the overthrow of the Franco regime.

This could be done,

according to the Polish government, under Article 2, para
graph 6, of the Charter under which the United Nations had
the authority to apply the principles of the Charter to
non-member nations.^

The Polish delegation also asked the

Security Council to take action under Articles 34 and 36
of the Charter and to adopt any other measures necessary
to bring about the collapse of the Franco regime#
The Polish request was read to the Security Council by

■* ifilda.. 491.
^ This paragraph stat.s that the "Unlt.d Hatlons shall
insure that states not members of the United Nations act in
accordance with the principles of the Organization." Ibid..
491.
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Lemge on April 2-i, 1946.

The members of the Council at

that time were : Australia, Brazil, China, Bygpt, France,
Mexico, Tha Netherlands, Poland, The Union of Soviet Sociallat Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States*
The delegate from Bygpt, Aflfi Paaha, was president* ®
The request of tha Polish government received widespread
attention in the newspapers of the United States, and pres
sure groups sent telegrams and memoranda

supporting** the

Polish request to the Becurlty Council.

On the day before

the Security Council met in New York, a memorandum on Spain
(drawn up by the "Nation A s s o o i a t e a , a liberal association,
and signed by the represoaNatives of eight national organ*
izatlons, including Philip

Murray of the Q.I.O.) was sub7
mitted to the president end members of the Oouncll.
The
Nation Associates wanted to show the Becurlty Oouncil that
they favored Security Council action on the Spanish ques
tion.
The Security Council unanimously agreed to place the
Spanish question on its agenda for its thirty-fifth meeting
on April 10, 1946.

At thl^meeting, Lange reviewed the

history of the Franco regime in Spain*

The Polish delegate

stated that it was a well known fact that the Spanish regime
had been installed with Axis help, and to prove his conten^ Ibid.. 491.
^ **The Shape of Things," Nation. April 19, 1946, 428.

tion be eited telegrams of congratulation from Hitler to .
Franco, letters written by Franco to MuBBOllnl and Hitler,
end tbe United States White Book.

Ho argued that the Franco

government was a cause of international frlcti n, that Spain
was e refuge for Kazis and former members of the Gestapo,
and that Spain was not co-oparating with the Allied govern
ments la their mttempte to recover German assets in Spain.
As a result of these Alleged facte, the Polish government
wanted the Security Council to call upon all membere of
the United Nations to break off diplomatic relatione with
the Franco government and to encourage the Spanish people
o
to overthrow the Franco regime.
Lange then introduced a resolution which he hoped would
lead to the collapse of the Franco regime :
The Sacur ity Oouroil declares that the existence
and activities of the Franco regime in Spain have
led to international friction and endangered the
aeintanance of international peace and security.
In accordance with the authority vested in it, under
Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, the Security Coun
cil calls upon all Members of the United Nations who
maintain diplomatic relations with the Franco govern
ment to sever such relations immediately.
The Security Council expresses its deep sympathy to
the Spanish people.
It hopes and expects that the
people of Spain will regain the freedom of which
they have been deprived with the aid and contrlv*
anee of Fascist Italy and Nasi Germany. The Secur
ity Council is cti^vlnodd that the day will come
® United Nations Official Records of tJhe Security Coun
cil . Meetings àd-gg. 1940. 549.
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when it will be able to eeloome the Spanish nag
tlon Into the eommunity of the United Nations.

The Polish resolution was vigorously denounced by the
Spanish government.

Franco offered to let those states

maintaining diplomatic relations with Spain send represent
atives to Spain to investigate the Polish charges.

These

representatives would be allowed to circulate freely,
“provided that once the Inaccuracy is proven, ample pub
licity will be given the results of the visit.
There is no evidence of any attention paid to the offer
in the United Nations, and a lively debate began over the
Polish resolution.

Alexandre Parodi of France gave his

full support to the Polish Proposal and pointed out that
the French government had already sent notes, in March, to
the United Kingdom and the United State© in an effort to
bring the Spanish question before the Security Council.
But these two nations had not agreed with the French gov
ernment.

Parodi said that the French government wanted

the United Nations to take a definite stand on the Spanish
question.

He claimed that the United States and Great

Britain had advanced unjustified objections: that the ex
istence of the Franco regime did not create a threat to
international peace and that, therefore, the Security
® Ibid., 660.
“Foreign Affairs,* Newsweek. April 22, 1946, 40.

B&

Council diù not h&ve jurisdiction; second, that the
Spanish problem was no concern of the United Nations;
third, that any action by the United Nations would only
strengthen the dictatorship.^^
Francisco Caetillo Najera of Mexico also spoke In
favor of the resolution, reaffirming his country’s de
sire to see democracy return to hpain.

Andreis A.

Gromyko of the Soviet Union also gave his support to
the motion, warning the Security Council to be care
ful lest it make tne same fatal miateke the League had
made in sponsoring the Kon-Intervention System; Gromyko
appeared to believe that the actions of the League had
made Franco's rise possible and hao also contributed to
the League's collapse.
Hot all of the countries were in favor of the res
olution.

The attitude of the United States was express

ed by Edward Stettinius who said that the United States
would not support any measure "likely to lead to civil
war."

Sir Alexander Oadogan of Great nritain stated

definitely that the United Kingdom would not give its
approval to the Polish resolution, because it believed
that the regime was not creating a threat to international
peace as the resolution claimed.

Council. Meftijgga M - m »

He stated that apparently

icibl Records at t^ke Security
ISSIT 606.

S6

Franco had thought that Hitler *a power was Irresistible
and that Hitler would conquer the European continent, so
Franco had wished to draw from that belief the best ad
vantage he could for Spain*

Sir Alexander intimated that

Franco was not alone In making that mistake and called for
a more thorough Investigation of the Spanish problem*

The

delegate from Brazil pointed out that It was not a part of
the Security Council's function to Intervene in Spain's
Internal affairs*

He Insisted, also, that member states

should consider non-intervention their only proper course*
Hr* Van Kleffens of The Netherlands also voiced his dis
approval of the resolution, arguing that diplomatic sanc
tions adopted against Franco would only hurt the Spanish
people.
The Council was hopelessly split on the Polish reso»
lutlon when Colonel Hodgeson of Australia offered a com
promise*

He wanted the Council to create a sub-committee

to Investigate the facts of the Spanish question and to
make some recommendations*

Colonel Hodgeson wanted the

proposed sub-committee to answer three questions*

First,

was the Spanish question essentially within the jurisdic
tion of the United Nations?

(And thereby within the jur

isdiction of the Security Council)

Second, was the sit

uation In Spain one which might lead to International
friction?

Third, was the situation In Spain likely to
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endanger the maintenance of international peace?
The Connell was unable to agree to this compromise
until the United Kingdom, France, and Poland reached an
agreement outside the Council hall, and it was not until
the next day that the Australian resolution, calling for
the creation of a sub-committee, was adopted.

12

Ten Coun

tries voted for the proposal, and only Gr j w a o of the
Soviet Union refused to vote for the resolution.

He

asserted that there was no need for a committee of in
vestigation and that his nation was absolutely opposed
to compromise.

But he would abstain rather than vote

against it.
The president of the Security Council declared the
resolution adopted and appointed the delegates from
Australia, France, Brazil, ChJna, ami Poland to serve
on the "Special Sub-Committee to Investigate the Spanish
Question."

Lange of Poland proposed that Hodgeson of

Australia be appointed chairman of the sub-committee,
13
and the Council approved.
Ho evidence was accepted from the Franco governmernt.
The sub-committee based its recommendations solely upon
evidence submitted by member nations and the exiled
Spanish Republican government.
Ibid. , 605.
Ibid. , 606.

The members of the sub-
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eommittse, of the opinion that the Spanish question was
of International eoneern and therefore exceeded the do
mestic jurisdiction of Spain, collected and listed data
14
under eight headings.
1.

The sub-committee was to determine the "origin#

the nature, and the structure of the Spanish regime,"
Its general conduct, and the extent to which the Insti
tutions and policies of the regime were compatible with
the principles of the United Nations.

The evidence ex

amined by the sub-committee led It to believe that Franco *s
success was mainly due to the assistance of the Axis pow
ers.

This assistance, according to the sub-committee, be

gan on the first day of the rebellion, when Hitler sent
Franco a Duetache Lufthansa plane for the historic flight
from the Canaries to Tetuan, and continued until the fall
of Madrid.

The sub-committee pointed out that Hitler had

admitted Intervening In Spain and quoted from Mussolini’s
article In %% Popolo d*Italia of May 20, 1938 In which
the Duce Is supposed to have written:
As for Spain, we have Intervened from the first to
the last moment.
Non, thousands of Italian off 1cars have had experience on Spanish battlefields.^
"Report of the Sub-Coramlttee on the Spanish Ques
tion", United m t l o n s security Council Official Records.
1st Year, 2nd Series, Special Supplement, June, 1946, 1.
Ibid. , 8.
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The «ub-oommlttee alao elted an art1ole from Stefanl.
the official Italian news agency, to the effect that
Italy had sent Franco 763 planea, 1,678 tone of bomba,
and 9,860,000 rounds of ammunition.

In short, the sub

committee claimed that as long as all three leaders (Fran
co, Hitler, and Mussolini) had admitted Axis aid to the
Franco regime during the Spanish civil war that there was
no question of whether the Axis had Intervened In Spain.
The sub-committee did not, however, determine what part
this aid played In Franco's success*
The structure of the regime, decided the sub-committee,
was patterned after the fascist governments of Italy and
Germany..

In July, 1937, Franco had stated that:

Spain will have the structure of totalitarian
regimes such as Italy and Germany.
According to the sub-committee, the general conduct of the
regime had been similar to that of the fascist countries,
and It claimed that the Palange,

hlch was the sole Spanish

political party, had adopted all the methods of the Germane
and the Italians.

The "Youth F r o n t w a s the same as the

organization of Mussolini's "Ballllas," and that the organ
ization, supervision, and control of the press and education
were under the authority of the state.
2.

The sub-committee was to determine the attitude of

Ibid.. 9. (quoted from the Hew York Times. February
28, 1946.
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the Praneo regime during World War II toward the Aillea
and toward the Axla.

On this Item the aub-oommittee eom-

mented that it seemed elear from numerous pronouncements.
of Franco that Spain had supported the Axis oeuse; he had
admitted on July 17, 1941, that:
The Axis is now a triangle comprising (Germany,
Italy, and Spain.17
The members of the sub-committee were of the opinion that
after the outbreak of war in Surope, Franco had prepared
for Spain's entry on the side of the Axis.

Moreover, the

sub-committee listed the types of aid given the Axis by
Franco: the Blue Division, the Salvador Air Squadron, the
use of Spanish ports for submarine and air bases, and sec
ret service aid.

It also recalled that Franco had sent

congratulations to the Japanese legation on the success
ful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and had recognized
the Japanese puppet regimes in China and the Philippines.
3.

The sub-committee was to determine the extent to

which the Franco regime continued to "harbour Oerman assets,
enterprises and personnel, Nazi agents, organizations and
war criminals and to tolerate their contact with Nazi end
Fascist organizations outside of Spain."1^

The sub-commit

tee estimated that German property In Spain had been worth
JÈlâi.. 18. (quot.d from S c n l . h Rapubllaan R.port)
Ibid.. 23.
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95,000,000 dollars, tout that some of this property had
toeen recovered toy the British and American Recovery Mis
sions.

It olalmea that Franco had co-operated In this

recovery only under "constant pressure" and that there
were still some 3,000 Qermans in Spain that could toe class
ified as "obnoxious."

It also charged that ex-Gestapo lead

ers directed the external services of Franco's espionage
system and of his Military Intelligence Service.
4.

The sub-committee was to estimate the numerical

strength of the armed forces of the regime. Including police
and security forces, in relation to the population end
resources of Spain and the strategic aims and purposes of
these forces.

The sub-committee estimated that the total

armed strength of the Franco regime was 800,000 men, the
total tonnage of the Spanish navy to toe 341,395 tons, and
the total number of aircraft to toe 4ÔQ.

The sub-committee

decided that these armed forces were only for defense.
(The sub-committee also noted that these forces were poorly
led, illequipcd, and of low morale.)
5»

The sub-cono&ittee was to estimate the production

of uranium and war materials and the extent of military
and naval research..

It was admitted that Spain had six

uranium mines, that Spain had not increased productivity
in any important industry, end that Spain was not preparing
for war#
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6*

The eub-eommlttee w&s to investigate the poro©-

eution of Hepublleans and other political opponent© and
the execution, imprieonment, and police supervision of
large numbers of the Spanish people.

The total number

of political prisoners in Spain eas estimated by the
sub-eommltt^ee to be 35,000, and the sub-committee "took
note" of the Spanish Republican claim that these prison
ers were treated horribly.

It also claimed that the pop

ulation of Spain was under constant supervision, control,
and terror as a result of the activities of Franco*a
secret police.
7.

The sub-committee was to investigate the detention

by the Franco regime of nationals of other countries.

The

sub-committee declared that there were only sixty-six for
eigners in Spanish prisons, and that the Spanish govern
ment was anxious to get rid of them.
8.

The sub-committee was to Investigate the pro-fascist

activities of the Palange party and other Franco organiza
tions outside of Spain.

The sub-committee alleged that

Spanish diplomatic officials

had for years been encourag

ing groups in the American republics to oppose intersAmer
ican unity against the Axis powers during the last war.
In these eight groups, the sub-committee had merely
repeated what had already been acknowledged by the United
Nations: that the Franco regime was partly fascist in origin,
character, and habit.

The most significant part of the re
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port «as th# seetlon on the Jurledlction of the Security
Council.

The eub-committee decided thet the Security

Council could not claim jurledlctlon under Article Z9,
elnee Spain was not creating a threat to the peace and
security of the world* nor had It committed an act of
a g g r e s s i o n . B y this conclusion the sub-committee de
clared that the Polish resolution was Illegal, because
the resolution had sought authority for the Security Coun
cil under Article 39.

But the members of the sub-committee

agreed that despite the Illegality of the Polish resolution,
the seriousness of the situation in Spain warranted some
action by the United Nations.
19 «Yhe Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken In accordance with Articles 41 and
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
(United Nations Charter and Statute of the International
Court of Justice, Chapter VII, Article 39, 17.)
"The Security Council may decide what measures not Involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to
its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may Include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of CMmunlcation, and the severance of diplomatic re
lations. ** (Ibid.. Article 41, 17.)
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provid
ed for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to
be Inadequate, it may take much action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore in
ternational peace and security.
Such action may Include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces of Members of the United Nations."
(Ibid..
Article 42, 17.)
”
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The sub-ooŒmlttee believed th&t the Security Council
should claim jurlsdletl n under Chapter VI of the Char
ter, which empowered the Security Council to examine **any
situation which might lead to international friction,’*
to determine whether the continuation of the situation
was **llkaly to endanger the maintenance of international
peace etid security.** 20

Having now decided that the Secur

ity Council had the right to take some kind of action. It
remained for the sub-committee to discover what action
the Council could take.

The members of the sub-committee

agreed, with the exception of Poland's Lange, that the
Security Council should communicate the findings of the
investigating group and Its own recommendation to the
deneral Assembly which would be able to claim jurladlctlon under the Charter*

21

In view of these conclusions the sub-committee made
three recommendations:
(a) the endorsement by the Beourity Council of the
principles contained in the declaration by the
20

IXJW.. 16 .

21
The General Assembly may discuss any question or
matter within the scope of the Charter not on the agenda
of the Security Council. However, it can only make recom
mendations; it can never command the member states to fol
low its recommendations. There is no veto in the General
Assembly, and important questions have a better chance of
being acted upon, since dec!eIons on such questions re
quire only a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting.
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government e of the United. Stetee, the United
Kingdom, end France, dated March 4, 1946:
(b) the transmitting by the Security Council to
the Caneral Assembly of the evidence and re
ports of the sub-committee together with the
recommendation thet unless the Franco regim^d
was withdrawn and the other conditions of
political freedom set out In the declaration
were In the opinion of the Cenerel Assembly
fully satisfied, a resolution would be pass
ed by the General Assembly recommending that
diplomatic relations be broken off by each
member;
(c) In the event that these conditions were ful
filled, Spanish application for membership
In the United Nations would be honored.
Lange of Poland was the only sub-committee member
who did not approve these recommendations, and he de
clared that the eub-committee had ignored the legal
jurisdiction of the Security Council.
The report was finished, published, and distribut
ed by June 6, 1946, six weeks after adoption of the
April resolution.

It constituted the most Important,

certainly the most positive, action of the Security
Council on the Spanish problem, but was admittedly a
summation of old charges against Spain, and not the re
sult of an Impartial Investigation or search for new
evidence.

It brought to light the very definite divi

sion among the members of the Council.
Ibid..

As for the Polish
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resolution. Franc©, th© Soviet Union, Poland, and
Mexico supported it, «A lie i:he United States, the Unit
ed Kingdom, Ohlns, and Brazil withheld their approval
on the drounds that the proposed action would have amount
ed to intervention in the domestic affairs of another
state, Australia played the role of compromiser*
When the Council voted on the Australian compromise,
that is, on whether to refer the question to a sub-com
mittee for "iaveatigationV» only the Soviet Union refrain
ed from voting.

The Soviet Union exercised its right of

abstention on the grounds that the formation of a sub
committee was unnecessary, for the Council already knew
the facte end any such investigation would delay action
on the Spanish question*

The split was less evident in

the work of the sub-committee, although there was a slight
disagreement over the question of the Security Council*a
jurisdiction, with Poland claiming that the Security
CouBcil had the right to make whatever decisions, to
take whatever action, it deemed necessary*
The name given to the sub-committee by the Security
Council has led to a mletaken belief thet the eub-commlttee was a special group of experts, unbiased and well
qualified.

In reality, it was no more then a group of

members of the Security Council (possessing the same dis
likes as in the Council)

who had retired to a smaller

TOOK to reach e eoBti^roialse on a quofirion th^y had been
unable to agree upon in the larger Security Council.
This compromise was reached without regard to the baalc
issue6 involved* whether the Franco regime was creating
a threat to international peace and whether the Epenlsh
people were being deprived of their freedoms in viola
tion of the principles of the Charter-

Only once had

the Council even mentioned asking for expert opinion,
end whan the United Kingdom had made this suggestion,
it was quickly passed over.

Each country, or group of

countries, seemed determined to protect its own inter
ests without thought of the purposes and principles of
the Charter.
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Chapter III.

The Stalemate In the Security Council
over the Spanish Question

The report of the ap e d a l subcommittee appointed by
the Security Council to investigate the Spanish question
had confirmed the alleged guilt of the Franco regime. It
also had recognized the right of the Security Council un
der the authority of the Charter to "take action on the
Spanish question."

The Security Council received the

sub-committee report on June 6, 1946 at Its thirtyseventh meeting.

The membership of the Council had not

changed, but Alexandre Parodi of France had replaced the
Bygptlan delegate as the Council president.
The president reminded the Council that the special
sub-committee had been appointed to examine the Spanish
question.

He requested Dr. Hugh Bvatt of Australia, the

new chairman of the sub-committee, to make his report.
Bvatt did not read the report of the sub-committee, since
It had been distributed to the delegates, but merely re
called the sub-committee's recommendation that the United
Nations should endorse the principles of the Three Power
Joint Declaration of March 4, 1946.

Bvatt felt that the

big question was how to apply these principles, and he
urged the Council to give Its full support to the recom
mendations of the sub-committee.

These Included a recom

mendation for the severance of diplomatic relations by all
member states of the United Nations with Franco Spain
which Bvatt defended by saying that:

39

it iB e form of aotion within the control of
the individual nation, and a common form of
expressing international disapproval.^
He claimed that since the Security Council had already
expressed its disapproval of the Franco regime, a sever
ance of diplomatic relations by the members of the United
Nations with Spain would
cil’s views.

toe

a natural result of the Coun

The Australian delegate argued that as long

as the United Nations would not admit Franco Spain to
membershipa no member of the United Nations should main
tain diplomatic relations with the Franco Government.
Evatt further reminded the Council that the sub-com
mittee had decided that the situation in Spain was not
creating a threat to international peace, and that, there
fore, the Security Council could not make arbitrary de
cisions on the Spanish question.

But since the sub-com

mittee had decided that the continuation of the situation
mi (dit lead to a threat to international peace, the Council
could make recommendations to correct the problem in Spain.
These could include a severance of diplomatic relations
^ United Nations Security Council Official Records.
1st Year, 2nd Series, 719.
® Article 34 of the Charter gives the Security Coun
cil the authority to conduct such an investigation. Arti
cle 39 gives the Security Council authority to apply the
sanctions of Articles 41 and 42
and only if the Coun
cil has decided that a breach or threat to the peace ex
ists £t the moment o£ sanction.

2
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frith Spain by all the members of the United Nations*
Bvatt also explained the recommendation of the aubcommittee that the Security Council refer the findings
of the sub-committee to the General Assembly which
would have jurisdiction over the Spanish question.

Said

Evatt:
We thought it proper that the Security Council
should not be final arbiter in this matter, but
as all the United Nations, and the natter of diplo
matic relations is involved, the matter should at
last go to the General Assembly.^
Evatt *8 statement raised protests from Lange of Po
land who claimed that Bvatt had hinted that the Security
Council did not have the jurisdiction to examine the Span
ish question.

Lange pointed out that he, himself, had

never questioned the Security Council’s right to examine
the Spanish question and that regardless of the findings
of the sub-committee, he was of the opinion that the Se
curity Council could take whatever action it deemed nec
essary to correct the Spanish problem.
Parodi indirectly supported Lange, and Gromyko of
the Soviet Union condemned the entire sub-committee re3
The General Assembly may discuss any question with
in the scope of the Charter and make recommendations to
the Security Council or to the members of the United Na
tions on any matter or question, as long as the Security
Council does not have the question on its agenda.
Council. 1st Year, 2nd Series, 761.

of the Security
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port, claiming thet the work of the eub-committee had
been a waste of time.

Gromyko reviewed the history of

Spaniah*German collaboration during the war and the ac
tivities of the "Blue Division," the memory of which
seemed to be a painful thorn in the side of the Soviets.
Gromyko asserted that if the United Nations did not take
the first step in the campaign to depose the Franco re
gime , the first step being a break in diplomatic rela
tions directed by the Oouneil, that the United Nations
would be failing in its duty to preserve the peace.

The

Soviet delegate argued that the sub-committee had not
dared to "draw the right conclusions although it was
well aware of what they were," and he demanded that the
Security Council (and not some lesser organ of the United
Nations) decide what action to take on the Spanish ques
tion.

Otherwise the authority of the Security Council

would be "undermined."
Herschel Johnson, the alternate delegate to the Coun
cil from the United States, did not agree with Gromyko.
He wanted the Oouiicil to modify the recommendations of
the sub-conmittee in such a way as to permit only the
General Assembly to act upon the Spanish question.

He

announced that the United States would support the recom
mendations of the sub-comnittee in the Security Council
but was reserving its vote in the General Assembly.

In
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other words, he would vote for the recommendation which
referred the Spanish question to the General Assembly,
but he was undecided as to how he would vote on the sec
ond part of the sub-committee's recommendation that the
United Nations break off diplomatic relations with Spain.
This line was followed by Aflfi Pasha of Bygpt who an
nounced that he would vote for the recommendation to re
fer the Spanish question to the General Assembly, but he
would not vote for any measure which called for a break
in diplomatic relations with Spain.
Sir Alexander Cadogan wanted to amend the recommenda
tion.

He argued that although the regime in Spain was un

doubtedly undemocratic and that Franco’s war record "was
certainly black enough," he did not think that the Secur
ity Council had any jurisdiction over the Spanish question
and that the form of government of a country was "under
the domestic jurisdiction of the c o u n t r y . T h e r e f o r e ,
he warned the Council to be careful that its actions did
not set a precedent out of line wi th its powers.

Ha pro

posed that the recommendation be amended so that it would
merely endorse the March 4, 1946 declaration of the United
States, Great Britain, and France and that it be sent to
® Ibid., 766.
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the General Assembly without any other recommendation.

Ô

The proposed British amendment was attacked by Evatt
of Australia who maintained that the aotion of the Secur
ity Oouneil as proposed by the sub-committee report would
not be intervention in Spanish affairs. He pleaded for
the adoption of the sub-committee*s recommendat1ons.
0-roD^ko of the Soviet Union end Lange of Poland also
opposed the British resolution, maintaining that the
original Polish resolution had not been drastic enough;
if the sub-committee*s recommendations were amended now,
it would be tantamount to taking no action at all.

And

if the amendment were accepted, the Polish delegation
would vote against the recommendations.
When the British amendment was put to a vote, Gromyko
of the Soviet Union and Lange of Poland voted against it,
and thus it failed to be adopted because a permanent mem7
ber of the Security Council had voted against it.
Then
the Polish resolution was put to a vote by the president,
■■

■

® Ibid. . T98.
Decisions of the Security Council on important (or
substantive) matters are made by an affirmative vote of
seven members, including the concurring votes of the five
permanent members, provided that a party to a dispute
shall abstain from voting. The preliminary question of
whether a matter is procedural or substantive is itself
substantive and therefore subject to the veto. There is
no set definition of just what matters are substantive,
but in practise they seem to be any matter in which a
Great Power has an interest.
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and it alao failed to be adopted because of the Goviet
Union’s opposition.

(That part of th© resolution that

contradicted the findings of the sub-committee and its
recoicmendation on the jurisdiction of the Security Ooun
eil had been eliminated.)

Indeed, the resolution, intro

duced by Lange of Poland, was so changed as a result of
the sub-committee*s recommendations that Lange, himself,
8
also voted against It.
The situation became hopelessly muddled when the
Polish delegate presented another resolution that the
Oouneil vote on the original Polish resolution without
considering the findings of the sub-committee.

He argued

that the Council had purposely pushed the Polish resolu
tion aside and that it was correct procedure to vote on
the original resolution.

The president of the Security

Council agreed with Lange and cdlled for a vote.

The

resolution was defeated, with only Frence, Mexico, the
Soviet Union, and Poland voting for it.
The Polish and Soviet Union delegations, not dis
heartened by this reversal, offered another resolution
designed to keep the Spanish question on the agenda of
the Security Council and out of the hands of the Ceneral
8

Lange voted against it not because the measure
was not strong enough, but because he believed that the
resolution should not go to the General Assembly.
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Assembly, a resolution which was the product of Coviet
fears thet the Spanish question would be transferred to
the Qreneral Assembly where the Soviet Union had no veto*
The resolution offered by the Polish end Soviet Union dele
gations read as follows:
The Security Oouneil takea notice of the report of
the Sub-Committee on the Spanish question appointed
on April 29, 1946. The Investigation of the Sub
committee confirms fully the facts which have led
to the condemnation of the Spanish regime by the Con
ferences in San Francisco and Potsdam, by the General
Assembly in London, and by the Security Council in
the resolution of April 24, 1946*
The Security Council, therefore, decides to keep
the situation under continuous observation and keep
the question on the list of matters which it is seiz
ed in order to take such measures as may be necessary
in the interest at peace end security*
The Security Council will take up the matter again
not later than September 1, 1946, in order to deter
mine what appropriate practical measures provided by
the Charter should be taken. Any member of the Coun
cil has a right to bring up the matter before the
Security Council at any time before the mentioned
date* ^
Bvatt of Australia attacked the combined Polish-Soviet
resolution on the grounds that it would defeat the very pur
pose for which it was intended.

Although the Polish dele

gate argued that this new motion would produce some positive
action, Evatt countered that it would merely bury the ques
tion in the Security Council where the General Assembly
United
Officiai Records _gf the Security Council, 1st Year, 2nd Series, 805•
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eould not &ot.
The combined Poll»h**Soviet Ualon reeolutloti wee not
put to a vote* but Lan&e Immediately offered another reeolutiom.

Thie reaelution# eelled the aeoond Folieh reao-

lution, eee almoet like the combined Poliah-Sovlet Union
resolution*

Only the phraseology wee different»

Svatt

of Australie took issue with the phraseology of the third
aentenee ehleh stated that the "Investigation also @etsbllahee beyond a doubt that Franco's faaclet regime Is
a serious danger to the maintenance of international peace
and security»"

This ess not shat the Investigation had

established; to the contrary. It had concluded that the
regime was not an existing threat to the peace. Bvatt
was of the opinion, along with Wang Shih Chleh of Ghina,
that unless new facta were brought before the Qouncil,
there were no grounds for further Council action.

If ac

tion were to be taken on the Spanish question, it would
have to be in the General Assembly.

r?vatt*s comment brought

forth assertions from Lange that it was not the intention
of hie motion to prevent action by the General Assembly
on the matter.

He appealed with the members of the Qouncil

to "not again become prisoners of legal Interpretation»")^^
Ibid» , 80b.
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The reBolutlon was also denounced by Alexander Cadogan
who one© again expressed hi® view that the Spanish ques
tion be referred to the General Assembly,

Therefore, he

proposed an amendment to strike out the clause requiring
the matter to be brougtit up before the Security Council by
September 1.
Soviet protests to the proposed British amendment were
voiced at once,

Gromyko argued that not only was the sec

ond Polish resolution the very mildest measure that could
be considered by the Council but that it and all th© other
proposals, resolutions,
were inadequate.

counter-proposals, end amendments

He said that as long as the Council seem

ed to be incapable of taking any concrete steps to remove
the menace of Franco Spain, the least it could possibly do
would be to keep the question on the agenda.

Gromyko warn

ed that the acceptance of the British amendiaent would so
distort the original resolution that nothing would "remain
but a blank space."

11

The split between the Soviet Bloc and the western
Allies was growing wider.

Even the French delegate, who

up to now had supported the Soviet attacks on the Franco
regime, recognized that the Polish proposal was not the re
sult of Soviet determination to remove Franco from Spain
but only an attempt to bolster the power and prestige of

Ibid., 819.
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the Security Council*

He ^ave his full support to the

British aczend&ent, as ciid Johnson, the United States al
ternate delegate*
It was clear, then,that the second Polish resolution
was doomen to failure# So the untiring Lange proposed the
appointaient of a drafting committee to construct a reso
lution favorable to a majority of the Council members.
The main question, of course, was whether the British amendment would be included by the drafting committee.

All

the Council members approved the selection of a committee,
and Parodl appointed the delegates of Australia, foland,
and the United Kingdom to draw up a uraift resolution on
the Spanish question*

This was a rather fitting selection,

since Svatt of Australia was chairman of the Special In
vestigating Committee, Lange of Poland the author of the
resolution, and Cadogan of the United Kingdom the author
of the amendment*
It did not ta^e this committee long to reach an agree
ment, and before the next meeting of the Council Svatt an
nounced that the drafting committee had been able to agree
upon a draft resolution which read:
Whereas the Security Council on April 29, 194S
appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the
situation in Spain#
,
and whereas Idrie investigation of the sub-com
mittee has fully confirmed the facts which
led to the condemnation of the Franco regime
by the Potsdam and San Francisco conferences.
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the General Assembly at the first part of Its
first session and by the Security Council by
resolution of the date above mentioned,
and whereas the sub-cmmilttee was of the opin
ion that the situation in Spain is one the con
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security,
it is hereby resolved that without prejudice
to the rights of the General Assembly under the
Charter, the Security Council deems the situa
tion in Spain under continuous observation and
maintains it upon the list of matters which it
is seized in order that it will be at all times
ready to take such measures as may become nec
essary to maintain international peace and se
curity; any member of the Security Council may
bring the matter up for consideration by the
Council at any time.
The only difference between this new resolution and
Lange*s motion was the deletion of the date clause re
quiring the Council to bring up the matter by September 1,
The resolution seemed to allow the General Assembly to ex
amine the situation, too, but in reality it did not!

The

resolution stated that "without prejudice to the rights
of the General Assembly under the Charter" the Security
Council would keep the question under continuous observa
tion.

This meant that the General Assembly would merely

keep the powers given it by the Charter; the Security
Council did not give it a new right (nor could it under
the Charter).

Therefore, the General Assembly could not

make any recommendations on the Spanish question as long
Ibid., 822.
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es the Security Council kept the matter under observa*
tion.
There were two interpretations of the resolution draft
ed by the committee, one by Poland and one by Australia,
so divergent that It was decided that In reality there
were two resolutions, and therefore, that the Council
would have to vote on each of them.

The Polish delegate

Interpreted the resolution to mean that the Security Coun
cil would take further action on the Spanish question be
fore the situation worsened, while the Australian dele
gate believed that the resolution meant that the Council
would not take further action on the Spanish question un
less It actually threatened International peace.

The In

terpretation of the Australian delegate was viewed by
Orcnayko as resulting "in a resolution both empty and ridi
culous."^^

Both Interpretations of the proposal were de

feated, with the Australian, British, end the American
delegates voting against the Polish Interpretation, and
the Soviet Union and the Polish delegates voting against
the Australian interpretation.
One Important implication of these votes on the two
interpretations of the resolution was that they marked
Article 12 of the United Nations Charter.
Ibid., 828.

ex

the turning point In the Mexican attitude toward Soviet
policy In the Oouneil*

For the first time in the history

of the Spanish question* the Mexican dele$;ate sharply
criticized Soviet intentions and asserted that the Soviet
Union was more interested in protecting the power of the
Security Council then in removing Franco from Spain#
The debate now became almost completely buried in
legal interpretation* with amendments* amendments to amendments* and procedural arguments* until it was finally
decided to put the resolution of the drafting committee to
a vote sentence by sentence#

This vote was to prove the

end of an affair described by Evatt as a "scandal."

Fran

cisco Najera* who had replaced Parodi as president* announc
ed that the proposal had been defeated because the Soviet
Union had voted against the sentences which gave the reso
lution its meaning.

The Security Oouncil now laid the Span

ish question aside#
Before the Oaneral Assembly can take action upon any
question being discussed in the Council* the Security Coun
cil must "remove the matter from the list of matters which
it has s e i z e d # W i t h respect to the Spanish question* ac
tion was taken at the 79th meeting of the Security Council
16
on November 4, 1946#
Strange as it may seem* the proposIbid.. 493.
Ibid.. 499.
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al to remove the Spanish question from the Security Coun
cil agenda was made by Lange of Poland, the seme man oho
earlier had worked so herd to defeat a similar proposai
In the Council.

Just three months before, the Soviet and

Polish delegates had sacrificed their desire to take ac
tion against Spain to defeat a resolution allowing the
General Assembly to examine the Spanish question.

At

that time, both Lange and Gromyko had vigorously opposed
any attempt to place the matter in the hands of the Gener
al Assembly.

How, on November 4, Poland changed Its policy,

and It was Lange of Poland who requested the Council to re
move the Spanish question from the agenda of the Security
Council.

The resolution prepared by Lange read:

The Security Council resolves that the sit
uation in Spain be taken off the list of
matters of which the Council Is seized, and
that all records and documents of the ease
be
at the disposal of the General AssemThis proposal was almost like the proposal which the
Soviet Union and Poland had defeated In resolution af
ter resolution just a few months before.
It is not hard to establish a motive for this change
in Soviet diplomacy.

A month before, on October 15, 1946,

the Council had unanimously resolved to make the Inter
national Court of Justice available to states not parties
|bid., 493.
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to the Statute of the Court.

Aft^r the International

Court resolution had been passed by the Council, Lange
once again had pressed his campaign against Franco Spain
by arguing that it would not be possible for Spain to
claim the advantages of the International Court because
of the character of its regime.

He had proposed a reso

lution specifically to exclude Spain from the Statute of
the Court:
In accordance with the resolutions adopted by
the General Assembly in London on the 9th of
February and the 10th of February, 1946, the
above resolution does not apply to those states
whose regimes have been installed Whth the help
of armed forces of countries which have fought
against the United Nations so long as these re
gimes are in power.!®
Prom the debate which followed the presentetion of
this resolution, it was evident that it was doomed to
failure, for the delegates of the United States, the
United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Brazil stated that
they would vote against the proposal, because it was
contrary to the "fundamental concepts of justice,"

When

the resolution was put to a vote, it was rejected, with
only France, Mexico, Poland, and the Soviet Union voting
for it.
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The Soviet Union and Poland beoame oonvliieed froti

this defeat that they would never attain their goal,
that la, the adoption of diplomatic sanctions against
Spain* so long as the matter remained In the Security
Council*

Hoping ttmt they would have a better chance In

the General Assembly, Lange proposed the dropping of the
Spanish question from the Council agenda.

The latest

Polish resolution was put to a vote on the same day and
was unanimously adopted* As a result, the General

As

sembly was free to act upon the Spanish question.
All In all, the action on the Spanish question in
the Security Council was a dismal failure*

The Soviet

Union and the Anglo-American faction failed to reach an
agreement, with both sides more Interested In further
ing their national interests than reaching a compromise*
The Soviet Union believed that the different resolutions
proposed in the Council were not drastic enough and re
fused to compromise.

The United States, the United King

dom, and their friends on the Council (Brazil, Bygpt,
Australia, The Netherlands, China) believed that it was
more important to refrain from interfering in the inter
nal affairs of a country than to depose the Franco regime*
The Soviet Union and Poland, too, allowed other consider
ations to influence their action in the Council*

At first,

they were afraid to let the problem slip out of the hands
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of the SeoLiTlty Govmell for fear that it would stranathen the General Aeeembly to Soviet disadvantage.

(In the

Security Council the Soviet Union could better watch over
Its own interests through the use of the **veto” than in
the General Assembly where decisions on important matters
require only a two-thirds vote of the members present and
voting.)

Mexico and France, influenced by pressures at

home, supported first one side and then the other, but
in the end they gave their support to the Anglo-American
bloc.

As the situation between the western Allies and

the Soviet bloc worsened and the picture of a Spain al
lied to the United States and the United Kingdom was en
visioned by the Kremlin, the Soviets agreed to place the
Spanish question on the agenda of the General Assembly.
The big question now was whether the Soviet Union would
be able to persuade the Assembly to adopt sanctions against
Spain after the Security Council had refused.
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Chapter IV.

A Change of Scene

The scene of action now changed from the Security Coun
cil to the Oeneral Aasembly#

Since the Council had felled

to adopt any measurea directed against the Franco regime
In Spain, much to the disappointment of the Polish and
Soviet Union delegations. It was now to the General Assembly
that these delegations looked for success.

The Spanish

question was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly
at the joint request of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Norway, and Venezuela and was Immediately referred to the
First Coraalttee on Political and Security Questions*

Dr.

Dlmltrl Z. Manullsky of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re
public was chairman of the committee when the Spanish ques
tion was introduced at the thirty-fifth meeting on December
8, 1946.
Lange, the former Polish delegate to the Security Coun
cil (Poland was not a permanent member of the Security Coun
cil and so used Lange as its representative In the General
Assembly when the Oouncil was not In session) and the most
determined of Franco's enemies In the United Nations, In
troduced the Spanish question to the committee.

He elo

quently stressed the Importance of taking action against
Franco Spain and again reviewed Franco's war record and
the Axis Intervention which brought him to power.

He also

reminded the committee of the findings of the Security

57

Council*» special sub-committee on the Spanish question,
and, possibly trying to make the report seem more Import
ant than It really was, incorrectly Interpreted It.

He

claimed that the sub-committee had found that the situa
tion created "isy the existence and activities of the Fran
co regime In Spain was a threat to the peace of the world,
when the truth of the matter was that the sub-committee
had found that the situation In Spain was not a threat
to the peace.

Lange asked the members of the committee

to draft a resolution which would actively aid the Span
ish people to throw off %he ®yoke of slavery".^
Taken as a #io]e , the coimlttee approved the request
of Lange.

Zuloaga of Venezuela defended the right of the

United Nations to deal with the Spanish question, end he
dismissed the claims of some members that United Nations
action against the Franco regime would be a violation of
the non-intervention clause of the Charter.

The Security

Council, he said, had already concluded that United Na
tions action would not Constitute Intervention (probably
referring to the sub-committee report).

Therefore, the

matter wad settled, as the General Assembly could not
question the decisions of the Security Council.
^ "Records of the First Committee",
General
Session. PA^ob&l:-^.se,pber, 104g» 3 6 ^

Zuloaga

United Nations
ZâEJLs. SSJâSSâ
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also requested the members of the committee to draft e
resolution which would aid the Spanish people In their
fight for freedom.
When Zuloaga finished, Connally of the United States
presented a draft resolution for the committee*s study.
This resolution assured the Spanish people of the warm
friendship of the United Nations and condemned the Franco
regime.

It declared that:

The General Assembly recommends:
that the Franco Government be debarred from
membership In international agencies set up
at the Initiative of the United Nations, and
from participation In conferences or other
activities which may be arranged by the United
Nations or by these agencies, until a new and
acceptable government Is formed In Spain.^
Conspicuously absent from the United States resolu
tion was any mention of a break in diplomatic relations.
In feet the exclusion of Franco Spain from the special
ised agencies as recommended In the United States reso
lution meant very little since membership In these agencies
Is not a requirement for the conduct of International re
lations.

(The Soviet Union In 19^1 belongs to none of

these agencies, has never belonged to more than four of
them).

The United States, by presenting Its moderate re

solution, hoped to prevent any drastic action against the
Franco regime.
^ Ib id .,

The resolution was not presented for vote
356
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but merely for study by the committee.
After the presentation of Connally*s proposal* two
very strong pro-Franco speeches were made by Rector David
Castro of El Salvador end Ricardo Fournier of Costa Rica.^
These two speakers denied that the United Nations had
jurisdiction in the Spanish question* claiming that any
United Nations action would be a violation of the non
intervention principle.

Fournier announced that his gov

ernment would not hesitate to recognize any regime so
long 8S it was stable and did not interfere with other
countries.
Saenz of Guatemala and Mora of Uruguay held a differ
ent view.

They argued that any attempt to maintain cor

dial relations with Franco would amount to intervention
in his favor.

The Nicaraguan delegate in turn rejected

this approach to the question, and* along with the Colom
bian delegate* supported the United States resolution.^
Lange countered the United States resolution by pro
posing that the committee adopt a resolution similar to
the United States resolution but also calling for a break
in diplomatic relations with Franco Spain.
From the debate between the friends and foes of the
United States resolution* it was evident that the résolu® Ibid. . 368.
* 1614.. 359.
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tlon wouXd not be aooeptable to a large majority In the
General Aasembly.

There were also many oomplalnta against

the Polish counter*proposal which called for a break in
diplomatic relations with Spain.

The strongest argument

against the Polish resolution was that if the General
Assembly celled for a break in diplomatic relations with
Spain* and the members of the United Nations failed to
comply, It would be a fatal blow to the United Nations.
(The General Assembly can never do more than recommend
action to the member states.)
It appeared that the Political Committee would be
unable to agree on a resolution dealing with the Spanish
question* totct Thor Thora of Iceland suggested a compromise.
Thors requested thet the Political Committee select a
sub-committee to examine the various proposals* resolutions,
and amendments and to draft a resolution acceptable to the
majority of the General Assembly.

The committee unanimously

approved the Iceland proposal * and it elected representatives
of the permanent members of the Security Council and the
authors of all resolutions* proposals, and amendments on
the Spanish question to serve on the sub-committee.

The

sub-committee was charged with the task of "seeking common
ground among the many resolutions and producing an original
&
resolution which might be unanimously acceptable."
^ Ibld^. 270.
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Oomposed of Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Soc
ialist Republic,'Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, France,
Guatemala, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States,
the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, this special
sub-committee delivered Its report on December 9, 1946 to
the forty-third meeting of the Political Committee.
(This
V'
sub-committee was not appointed to investigate the Spanish
question and to make corrective recommendationsf but merely
to reach a political compromise between the Great Powers.)
After a short discussion of the draft resolution^prepared
by the committee, short because the battle had already
been won in the sub-committee hearings,^ the resolution
was put to a vote, paragraph by paragraph, and finally
6
adopted.
;«
At long last a resolution was to reach the General
/
Assembly which promised the Franco regime some real trou
ble and which was acceptable to the majority of the mem
bers of the United Nations.

The resolution, one of the

most important in the history of International organization,
(this was the first time that the character of government
of a country was deemed incompatible with the principles
of "right and justice" as determined by the rest of the
6

^
Ibid.-. 293.
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world) declared that %
The peoples of the United Nations at San Francisco,
Potsdam and London condemned the Franco regime in
Spain and decided that as long as the regime remains,
Spain may not be admitted to the United Nations.
The General Assembly in its resolution of Feb
ruary 9, 1946, recommended that the Members of
the United Nations should act in accordance with
the letter and spirit of the declarations of
San Francisco and Potsdam.
The peoples of the United Nations assure the Span
ish people of their enduring sympathy and of the
cordial welcome awaiting them when circumstances
enable them to be admitted to the United Nations.
The General Assembly recalls that in May and June 1946,
the Security Council conducted an investigation of
the possible further action to be taken by the United
Nations* The sub-committee of the Security Council
charged with the investigation found unanimously:
(a)

In origin, nature, structure, and
general conduct the Franco regime
is a fascist regime patterned on,
and established largely as a result
of aid received from Hitler's Nazi
Germany and M u s s o l i n i F a s c i s t Italy*

(b)

During the long struggle of the United
Nations against Hitler and Mussolini,
Franco, despite continued Allied protests,
gave very substantial aid to the enemy
powers. First, for example, from 1941
to 1946 the Blue Infantry Division, the
Spanish Legion of Volunteers and the
Salvador Air Squadron fought against
Soviet Russia on the Eastern front*
Second, in the summer of 1940, Spain
seized Tangier in breach of inter
national statute, and as a result of
Spain maintaining a large army in
Spanish Morocco, large numbers of
Allied troops were immobilized in
North Africa.

(e)

Incontrovertible documentary evidence
establishes that Franco was a guilty
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party with Hitler and Mussolini in the
oonsplraey to wage war against those
eountries which eventually in the course
of the war became banded together as the
United Nations.
It was a part of the
conspiracy that Franco’s belligerency
should be postponed until a time to be
mutually agreed upon.
The General Asaembly, convinced that the Franco
Fascist Government of Spain, which was Imposed by
force upon the Spanish people with the aid of the
Axis powers during the war, does not represent
the Spanish people and by Its continued control of
Spain Is making Impossible the participation of the
Spanish people with the peoples of the United Nations
In international affairs;
recommends that the Franco Government of Spain be
debarred from membership in international agencies
established by, or brought Into relationship with
the United Nations, and from.participation in
conferences or other activities which may be arranged
by the United Nations or these agencies, until a new
and acceptable government is formed in Spain.
The General Assembly further desiring to secure
the participation of all peace-loving peoples.
Including the people of Spain, in the community
of nations:
I
Recommends that If within a reasonable time there
Is not established a government which derives its
authority from the consent of the governed, com
mitted to respect freedom of speech, religion and
assembly, and to the prompt holding of an election
In which the Spanish people, free from force and
intermediation and regardless of party, may ex
press their will, the Security Oouncil consider
the adequate measures to be taken in order to
remedy the situation and:
Recommends that all members of the United Nations
iBuaediately recall from Madrid their Ambassadors
and Ministers plenipotentiary accredited there.
304
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This resolution anast be eonsldered a mild diplomatic
victory for the Soviet bloc# as It was almost Identical
(at least In the action It called for) to the Polish pro
posals made In the Political Committee* 'However# there
was one slight difference; a difference which appears to
be slight# but In reality was very Important*

The Polish

proposals had called for a break In diplomatic relations#
while the proposed resolution only recommended that the
members of the United Rations recall their ministers and
ambassadors*

This did not mean a break In diplomatic re

lations# and Franco would have all the advantages of dip
lomatic recourse offered by the legations# but he would
have to deal through a minor official# probably an attaché
or a chargé d*affairs.

The resolution also accepted the

findings of the sub-committee appointed by the Security
Coiuicll without reservation*
The Political Committee presented the resolution to
the General Assembly on December IS# 1946*

At once the

debate began all over again# but the enemies of Franco
were convinced that the resolution would be adopted*
Nieto del Rio of Chile argued that the resolution was
not all that could be hoped for# but at least It was a
step In the right direction* Moreover# the Spanish people
would surely welcome this documen^ as evidence that the
majority of the members of the United Nations ”support

m

B

them in their fervent deeire for freedom. **

He aleo

eeverely eritielted those membere of the United Hatlons
eho had atteeked the résolution as a violation of the
prlneiple of non-intervention and challenged them to pro
duce a valid argument proving that the resolution vould
be ft violation of the non-Intervention clause of the Oharter.

Perhaps del Hlo considered the Security Oounoil's

"Special Sub-Oommittee on the Spanish Question" (which had
declared the situation caused by the ^ranco regisie in Spain
to be one "essentially not within the domestic control" of
Spain) to toe the highest legal authority on the subject.
The resolution was also defended by Leon Jouhoux of France
who pointed out that It was not an act by the United Hâ
tions, but merely an act of sovereignty by the individual
nations at the recommendation, not the oosmand, of the
United Nations.
These views were not shared by Alfonso Lopes of Golom
ble, who said that the United Nations could hardly impose
sanctions on ©pain with the backing of such ft small ma
jority (the majority which passed the resolution in the
ccHsmittee where only a simple majority of the members vot
ing was needed might not be enough to pass the resolution

àsujkmHx. g‘g.,ri„tlgg Easspâa»
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in the General Aseembly where a two-thirds majority of
the members present end voting was needed).

He express

ed his fear that the United Nations "was fast violating"
the prinsiples of the Charter and thought that the time
had come to "fix limits* provide for exeeptions so that
we may organize the world aeeording to the prineipies of
the Charter."®

He wondered if "this intervention*! would

not lead eventually to a demand that member nations al
ter their dixaestla laws to suit the majority of the As
sembly.

(He eonsidered that this resolution meant that

the United Nations was trying to foree a dhanga in the
domestie law of Spain at the request of ^ e majority in
the General Assembly.)
Lopez came closer to expressing the most logical
argument against any action by the United Nations on the
Spanish question than any speaker since the question had
been introduced idien he said:
Today we are dealing with Spain. But Spain is not
the only country in which all the fundamental free
doms are not respected; nor is it the only one to
which an invitation might be extended to change its
government and revise institutions and political
practices in the manner desired by a majority of
,the United Nations. We are in the act of impos
ing on a state which does not yet belong to our
organization, standards of political life which
are not yet fully applied in several of the mem
ber countries. 10

9 IbHt. . 1172.
Ibid. . 1172.
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Ho concluded by remarking that he was not defending the
policy of non-intervention, but he wanted to know just
<

I

what path the United Nations Intended to follow.

If It

were to be a policy of Intervention, the Oharter should
' ''
be changed to permit this policy.
The attack upon the resolution was then taken up
t

'

by Castro of El Salvador.
I f

Of

i

He accused President Spaak
L*

.

the General Assembly of restricting the debate In
■ (

such a manner that It tended to favor the supporters of
the resolution.

This accusation was denied by Spaak,

and the members of the Assembly expressed their confldence In his fairness and Impartiality.

The arguments

against the resolution were reviewed by Castro, who di
vided them Into five classifications.

First, the conse

quences of the isolation to which Spain would be condemn
ed would not affect the government of Spain, but they
would cause the Spanish people to suffer needlessly#

Sec

ond, the only possible effect on the government of Spain
would be to bring the Spanish people to such a state of
despair that they would try to depose the ^ranco regime
by the means of a bloody civil war.

Third, while the

resolution was being discussed and when there was abso
lutely no foreign Interference In the affairs of Spain,
now was the time to permit the Spanish people to decide
for themselves without outside help what kind of govern-
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ment they wanted.

Fourth, the Imposition of diplomatia

sanetione against Spain would be intorventlon in a mat
ter which according to the Oharter of the United Nations
belonged within the Internal jurisdiction of Spain* Fifth,
if the resolution were passed by the Oenercl Assembly, it
would constitute an invasion of the powers of the Secur
ity Council, which alone had the right to cell for coer
cive meaaures.

These arguments were presented by vari

ous other nations, but the most vigorous attack against
tiw resolution was the denunciation by Castro.
The speeches by del Rio of Chile, Lopez of Colombia,
and Castro of HI Salvador contained the most important
of the arguments for and against the resolution which
recommended that the members of the United Nations recall
their aiabaesadors from Madrid.
There were two important legal questions raised by
the debate.

What were the rights and duties of member

states of the United Nations?

And was it the duty of a

member state to follow the recommendation of the General
Assembly?

The subsequent action by the members seemed to

show that the states did not have to follow the recommenda
tions of the United Nations*
President Spaak managed to limit the debate on the res
olution and finally put it to vote.

The roll call vote

showed that the measure had been adopted with thirty-four
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1b favor of* the reeolution, and six against, with thlrteen abatentlona. II Those nations voting for the resolution were:
Âustralla
Luxembourg
Belgium
Mexico
Bolivia
Hew Zealand
Brazil
Nicaragua
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Norway
Panama
Republic
Philippine Republic
Chile
Poland
China
Paraguay
Czechoslovakia
Sweden
Denmark
Ethiopia
Ukrainian Soviet Social
ist Republic
France
Guatemala '
United Kingdom ,
Uruguay
Haiti
Iceland
United States
Union of Soviet Socialist
India
Republice
Iran
Liberia
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Those nations voting against the resolution were;
Argentina
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic

Ecuador
El Salvador
Peru

Those nations abstaining were:
Afghanistan
Canada
Colombia
Cuba
Sygpt
Greece

Honduras
The Netherlands
Saudi Arabia
Syria

Turkey

Union of South Africa

The adoption of the resolution showed that a majority
of the members of the United Nations favored action on the
Spanish question*
11

1206.

The action promised by the resolution.
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ho#ever, would not (it eeemod probable) effect the Franco
regime any more than the previous condemnations (Potsdam,
San Francisco, and the Three Power Joint Declaration.)
The resolution was more important in revealing that
the members of the United Nations oould still reach an
agreement on an important question.

The adoption of the

resolution was a victory for the enemies of Franco in the
United Nations.

It did not promise to remove Franco from

Spain, but at least it was a step in that direction, and
it left the responsibility for the Spanish question to the
Security Council.

Lange of Poland must be given the ^cred

it" for the resolution.

He introduced it before the Secur

ity Council, was a member of every drafting committee, of
the First Committee on Political Questions, Introduced the
resolution to the Ceneral Assembly, and gave his support
to the resolution at every opportunity, both within the
United Nations and behind the scenes.
Resolution ”39(1)** as it was officially known, which
recommended that the members of the United Nations recall
their diplomatic representatives from Kadrid, was the high
point in the United Nations campaign against Franco Spain.
The western Allies and their followers in the United Nations,
despite their doubts of the efficacy of the resolution, voted
for it in an effort to achieve unanimity in the Ceneral As
sembly.

Resolution 39(1) was the last proposal on the
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Spanish question ehieh found the wastsrn Allies and the
Soviet Union voting together*
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Chapter V.

The Failure of The General Assembly
Resolution

Supporters of the United Nations awaited the out
come of the Assembly's recommendation for an immediate
recall of ambassadors and ministers accredited to Mad
rid.

The bis question was whether the nations whose dele

gates in the United Nations had fought and voted against
the resolution would comply with its provisions.

It was

a test of the effectiveness of the new world organization,
for if the members of the United Nations refused to follow
the recommendations of the General Assembly, then the
prestige of the United Nations would suffer, and it would
seem to be following in the footsteps of the League.

The

effectiveness of the resolution was not officially known
until the publication of the "Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Work of the Organization" in July, 1947.
Immediately after the resolution had been passed by
the General Assembly, the Secretary-General had sent a
circular telegram on December 20, 1946 to all member na
tions requesting that they inform him of the action they
were taking in accordance with ^ e

resolution.^

1947, he had received fifty-five replies.

By July,

These were

divided into six classifications:
(1)

Three states <B1 Salvador, the United Kingdom,

and The Netherlands) had recalled their diplomatic repreQCIiJll&I E&&PEÉ#, a L

vistn% a t taa.
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sentatives in Madrid Immediately following adoption of
the résolution by the Assembly.
(2) nineteen states (Brazil« Belgium, Chile, Colom
bia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Bygpt, France,
Greece, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, Tur
key, the United States, and Uruguay) had no ambassadors
or ministers accredited to Madrid at the time of l^e adoptlon of the resolution:

their legations had been In

charge of minor officials.
(3) The largest classification was that group of
states (Af^anistan, Australia, Bolivia, Byelorussian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia,
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India,
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand,
Panama, Poland, the Fhlllplne Republic, Saudi Arabia,
Siam, Syria, Union of South Africa, Ukranian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia) which had had no diplcxnatie
relations of any kind at the time of the adoption of the
resolution.

2

(4) Liberia assured the United Nations that it would
adhere to iûne resolution, but at present its minister
was still in Madrid.
(ô) The Dominican Republic informed the United
^ Ib id . ,

3

.
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Mations that it had not daeided what to do about the
résolution but assured the 8eoratary-General that ha
"would be the first to know."
(d) The one state whieh did not comply with the
reooamendation of the General Assembly was Argentina.
The Argentine govarnmant had simply aeknowladged receipt
of the communication, but it was later revealed that it
had not only refused to recall its ambassador from Madrid,
but had even sent a new ambassador, an action distinctly
contrary to the United Rations recommendation.
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly also
had excluded Franco Spain f rom membership in the special
ized agencies of the United Nations, and these agencies
ware complying with the resolution completely.

In July,

1947, at the time of the Secretary-General *s report, the
Bconmaic and Social Council had excluded Franco Spain
from participation in any of the coxmmisalons of the Gouneil.

For instance, the Social Commission had refused

to consult with any agency maintaining relations with
Spain, and the Economic and Social Council approved this
decision at its fourth meeting.^
In line with the General Assembly resolution, the
Bconomic and Social Council resolved that "international
® Ibid.. a.
'* yfM-UgffiH St. Saa. Onlt.d Matlon». 1947. 344.

R o m - # » v # r R m e n t o r g & n l z e t l o n » , the policies of whieh
era eoatrolled fey the Franco Ooverrimant^ cannot fee eonsiAcred for eoasiiltetive statua***^

The Ooimcil eonclnd*

ad that international non-goremmantal organizations
shoald fee allglfel# for **eonsultatlTS status*’ If:
(1) They had only individual représentatives in
Spain w h l ^ were not organized Into a legally constituted
"Spanish feranch;"
(S)

There were such legally constituted branches in

Spain# and if they had a purely humanitarian character
end their policies were not controlled and determined fey
the Franco Government.^
The question of Franco Spain also arose in connection
with the transfer to th@ United Nations of the powers ex
ercised hy the League of Nations under the agreements on
narcotics.

The Bconomic and Social Council invited all

non-BC3â>era except Franco Spain to become parties to the
new protocol.
Thus# the results of the resolution were better than
had been expected# with only Argentina refusing to com
ply with the recommendation of the General Assemfely to
recall its diplomatic representative from Madrid.

Pro-

Franco 21 Salvador# en the other imnd# recalled its min»
® Ibid.. 345.
6
Ibid. # S47.
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leter from Madrid after having fought against
tion of the resolution*

adop

Even though the members of the

United Kations who had not been in favor of the resolu
tion still held the same views that they had expressed
in the General Assembly, they complied with the terms
of the resolution because they wi shed to support the
United Kations and not because they approved of the reso
lution*

(The resolution had recommended that those mem

bers who had diplomatic representatives In Madrid recall
them.

It requested nothing from those members Who had

no ministers in Spain*

In a sense, however, these mem

bers were aoaqilying with the resolution*

Certainly,

they took no action to establish relations with the
Franco Government.)
Three months later, in November, 19^7, the Spanish
question was again brought up In the General Assembly.
The last paragraph of the General Assembly resolution
adopted on Deeember 12, 1946, had stated that If within
a "reasonable time" a new government in Spain had not
been established acceptable to the United Nations, the
Security Council would "consider the adequate measures
to be taken to remedy the situation.

Almost a year

had passed, and still Franco was supreme in Spain*

The

Security Council had failed to take "adequate measures"
7

See Chapter IV, page 64*
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to remedy the eituatlon in Spain, end ao the question
was brought up in the General Aseembly by Lange of Po
land*
The Spanish question was referred to the First Oomspittee on Politieal Questions ehich discussed the matter
at its 103rd meeting on November 10, 1947.

The first

speaker «as Arturo Despradel of the Dominican Republic
«ho reminded the committee that his government had al
ways opposed the resolution because it constituted in
tervention in Spanish affairs.
Lange of Poland protested that Despradel W d mis
interpreted the facts.

He requested that the United

Nations follow up the resolution calling for a recall
of ministers from Spain by adopting economic sanctions
against the Franco regime and submitted a draft resolu
tion which read:
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming again its resolution 39 (I) of December
IS, 1946, concerning relations of Member states of
the United Nations with Spain,
FeccsmiendB to the Security Council that it con
sider within a month the Spanish question and
that it take adequate measures in conformity with
Article 41 of the Charter, in order to remedy the
present situation according to the resolution of
Deeember 12, 1946.8
® United Nations Official Records of the General Assem
bly. Records of the First Committee, 1st Part, Second Session,
November, 1947, Annex 20-A, No. A/O1/269, 620.
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The Polish delegate, hoped that the adoption of the resolutlon would lead to the applloation
of économie sanctions
V
{
against Franco Spain*
Lange was supported in this view by
Stolk of Venezuela and Maaaryk of Gzeehoslovakia who also
called for stronger measures to be taken by the General
Assembly.

They declared that they would vote for any

measure which would lead to the establishment of ^tpue
liberty" in Spain.^
The opposition to Lange's resolution was led by the
delegations of The Netherlands* Belgium, and Oanada*

Van

Roijen of The Netherlands said that it would be useless
to adopt resolutions which appeared on the surface to con
demn the Franco regime in Spain but which in reality were
of "doubtful constitutionality and which might strengthen
the Franco r e g i m e * H e

said that the resolution of De

eember IS, 1946, had actually strengthened Franco by rally
ing to him certain groups of Spaniards who objected to
what they considered as foreign interference in the affairs
of their country.
Van Roijen was supported by Sir Zafrullah Khan of Pak
istan who questioned the jurisdiction that the United Na
tions had already assumed in its dealings
with Franco
1'
(
Spain.

He thought that the imposition of sanctions as
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called for in Article 41 of the Charter might oomeday
commit the United Kations to aggressive action by the
majority vote of the General Assembly.

This was another

way of saying that the resolution of December 12, 1946,
amounted to direct intervention in the internal affairs
of s country in violation of the Charter.
This snjce line of reasoning was followed by the dele
gate from Peru who claimed that **the actions of a state,
not the dialeticf^ of e third party,” could provide the
only grounds for justified action by the United Nations.
VyorjR Lakshmi Fondit of India declared that a wider issue
than the welfare of the Spanish people and the election of
a government sntl&factrry to tbo United Kctiens was Involv
ed.

She pointed out tliat the resolution of Doceaber 18,

1946, had been ineffective as far ee changing the regime
in Spelr was concerned and tliut it had imperiled the pres12
tlge of tha
I ted Nations.
It was clear from the dlscusalona that many of tJio
members of the cormaittee considered that the imposition
of econoiBle sanctions was too severe.

However, some of

the Ren bare believed that some action should be taken on
the Spanish question, so a joint resolution was pre
sented by Belgium, The Netharlands, and Luxembourg.
11 Ibid.. 407.
Ibid., 408.

The
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résolution« k,nomn &s th© B-îucIux resolution, deelared
that:
The Genex’al
Takes acte of the L’eoretary-üeneral ^s annual Report
dealing with the relatione of members of the United
Uatlons with Spain, and notea the measures taken by
virtue of resolution 39 (I) regarding such relations
adopted by tho tîenerc.1 Asaoiably on December 13, 1946;
kegrets ünac the rsco2ananda\:ion inviting all Members
of the United Nations to recall their ambassadors
and ministers plenipotentiary from Hadrid immediately
has not been fully applied;
Sxpresses Its confidence that the Security Council
will exercise Its rssponsibllities for the mainten
ance of international peace end security as soon as
the Spanish question shell require the adoption of
such measures.
This resolution did not recommend any action on the Spanish
question.

It merely expressed the "hope" of the General

Assembly that the Security Council would do its duty if
the occasion should ever arise.

It did not recommend

that the Security Council take action on the Spanish
question even in the future, unless the Security Council
deemed it necessary.
The Benelux draft resolution was followed by a resolution
drawn up by the delegations of Mexico, Cube, Guetamala, Pan
ama, and Uruguay.

It was introduced by the Mexican delegate

who wanted the General Assembly to refrain from passing any
13

Ibid.. Annex 20-0, No. A/C1/861, 626.

81

measure stronger than the resolution of December 12, 1946.
The resolution merely affirmed this declaration, and read:
The General Assembly,
Reaffirms Its resolution 39(1) adopted on December
12, 1946, concerning relations of Members of the
United Nations with Spain, and
Expresses Its confidence that the Security Council
will exercise Its responsibilities under the Char
ter should It consider that the situation In Spain
so requires.*’
The United States delegate, supporting the Latin-Amer
ican and Benelux resolutions, affirmed that the United
States would oppose any proposal which might cause vio
lence, or impose undue hardship on the Spanish people,
or which might give rise **to endless repercussions.
The United States was supported by the Indian delegate,
who also warned against any strong measures.
Just the opposite view was held by the members of the
Soviet bloc.

Gromyko of the Soviet Union made the strong

est speech yet heard on the Spanish question.

He re

capitulated the whole history of the Spanish affair,
stressing the part played by the United States and the
United Kingdom.

He directly accused the United States

and the United Kingdom of protecting Franco In the United
14
Ibid., Annex 20-B, No. A/C1/260, 626
iSiât. 418.

Mations.

Ho said, in part:

The volume of trade between those countries and
Spain had increased considerably.
Spain had
been granted large credits, especially by Argen
tina. British and American capital controlled
a number of industries In Spain; no attempt was
made to hide their economic relations: on the
contrary the countries in question sought Just
ification in the fact that it would be difficult
for them to do without their business relations
in Spain.
It was evident from the debate that neither the
Benelux nor the Latin-Amerioan resolution would receive
the necessary two-thirds vote.

A dangerous split in the

committee was averted when Cuba and France proposed the
selection of a sub-committee to find a resolution ac
ceptable to a majority.

The committee approved this

proposal by twenty-three votes to seventeen, with eleven
abstentions, and the chairman appointed the delegates of
Belgium, Cuba, Mexico, Cuatemala, India, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Panama, Poland, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia to
serve on the sub-committee.

jff

The sub-committee, or drafting committee, did not take
long to reach an agreement on a draft resolution.

This

resolution was presented on behalf of the sub-committee by
the delegate from Cuba on November IB, 1947, and read as
ISOâi.. 412
Ibid. . 413

follows:
Whereas the Secretary-General in his annual report
has informed the General Assembly of the steps taken
by the Member states of the Organization in pursuance
of its recommendation of December IS, 1946;
The General Assembly,
Reaffirms its resolution 39(1) adopted on December IS,
1946 concerning relations of Members of the United
Nations, with Spain and,
Expresses its confidence that the Security Council
will exercise its responsibilities under the Charter
as soon as it considers that the situation so implies*
After the resolution had been read to the committee, the
Argentine delegate expressed his thanks **on behalf of the
Spanish people" that the Polish resolution calling for the
adoption of economic sanctions had been withdrawn*

19

Be

fore the resolution was put to a vote, the delegates made
their customary speeches explaining how they would vote
and without exception held the same views that they had
before the drafting of the resolution.
After the last of the explanatory speeches, the chair
man called for a roll-call vote^ paragraph by paragraph,
on the resolution proposed by the drafting committee.

The

entire resolution was adopted by the Political Committee
with twenty-nine countries voting for, six against, and
la
10

Ifeidfu, 612
422
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twenty abstaining*
Those countries voting for the resolution were:
Belgium
Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic
Chile
China
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
Ethiopia
France
Guatemala
Haiti
Iceland
India

Iran
Liberia
Luxembourg
Mexico
New Zealand
Norway
Panama
Poland
Sweden
Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

The six countries voting against the resolution were:
Argentina
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic

El Salvador
Paraguay
Peru

Those countries abstaining were;
Australia
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Bygpt
Greece
Honduras
Iraq
Lebanon

The Netherlands
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Philippine Republic
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United States
Yemen

The significant result of the vote was noticed by
Gromyko of the Soviet Union in expressing his regret that
the United States, after voting for the resolution in 1946,
refused to re-affirm it in 1947.

Thus the United States

was separating itself more and more from the Soviet policy
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d#dleated to dopoaine Franco In Spain*

Tho Soviets accused

the United States of protecting the American dollar in
Spain and of sacrificing Its Ideals of freedom to achieve
this protection.

A likelier reason was that world events

were dividing these former allies* and the United States
was reluctant to help the Soviet Union destroy a potential
ally*

Events In 1950 and 1961 seem to prove that the United

States would like Franco Spain for Its ally*

(In 1950 the

Republican leaders advised the Inclusion of Spain in the
Atlantic Pact; In March* 1951* Oongress voted to include
Spain In the Atlantic Pact; and In June* 1951* the Demo
crats recommended the inclusion of Spain In the Atlantic
Pact.)
The Political Qommittee sent Its report* with the res
olution reaffirming the December 12* 1946* resolution* to
the Oeneral Assembly*

The Assembly Immediately placed the

Spanish question on Its agenda* and on November 17* 1947*
the president called for the Raonorteur to present his re
port.

The Rapporteur* Kaufman of Denmark* read the res

olution proposed by the Political Committee.

Since there

had already been extensive debate on the matter In the
committee* the number of speakers was limited*

aembly.
29, I9 4 7

7 1
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Ity of the speeches made were similar to those de
livered In the Political Committee.
Klslev, of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
accused the United States and the United Kingdom of
falling to cooperate In removing the vestiges of
Nazism from Europe.

Tho deelaratlons of the three great

powers of the antl-Hltler coalition had Indicated their
Intention of stamping out the remains of fascism in the
world, but according to Klslev, the reactionary forces
of the world were delaying this purge by giving every
possible support to the fascist regimes in Spain, Port
ugal, and Greece.

The Spanish problem was closely link

ed to the German problem, and he claimed that the western
zones of Germany had not been purged of Nazis.

The Nazi

party was recovering from the first shock of defeat,
and:
the monopolistic organizations which have sup
ported the Hitlerite regime and inspired Its
aggression have not only not been liquidated,
but are even being supported by the United
States and the United Kingdom authorities. A
number of Nazis cen still be found in respon
sible economic and administrative poets.
We
know from the Press that German reaction, with
the support of reactionary forces in Great
Britain and the United States Is trying to
gather Its forces.
He maintained that this policy of the western powers In
Ibid.. 1087.
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Germany had had Its affect In Spain, and that the United
States and Great Britain were actually protecting Franco*
Klslev concluded his speech with a plea to the Assembly
to strengthen Its action by adopting economic sanctions
against Franco*
Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom del
egatee replied to Klslev*s accusations, and the president
of the Assembly was able to call for a vote, paragraph
by paragraph.

Whan the vote was completed. It showed

that the second paragraph, the important section which
reaffirmed the resolution celling for a recall of dip
lomatic representatives, had failed to pass.

The fJLrst

paragraph, which merely acknowledged the Secretary-Gen
eral *s report, was not even voted on.

The third para

graph, which expressed the confidence of the General
Assembly in the Security Council, was easily adopted.
Those countries which had refused to vote for the res
olution included:
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
B1 Salvador
Greece

lÈlAu. loss

Honduras
The Netherlands
Nicaragua
Peru
Philippine Republic
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United States
of America
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Despite this defeat* the Polish delegate still con
sidered that the recommendation of December 12, 1946, was
in force, end he was supported by a number of other
delegates.

This caused the representative from Argentine

to:
point out that events have shown that here it is
not a matter of promoting international peace and
security but simply a matter of polities, other
wise how could it happen that when this Assembly
refuses to re-affirm the resolution adopted last
year with respect to the Charter, there are still
representatives who consider that that resolution
still stands.^’®
The resolution of December, 1946 was gradually
losing its effectiveness.

It had received the accept

ance of all but one of the fifty-five nations in Dec
ember, 1946.

Bow the United Bâtions, one year later,

refused to re-affirm it.

However this refusal was

nothing more than a moral repudiation of the resolution,
and the resolution was still binding (if a recommendation
can be considered as binding).

Bven the countries that

had voted against the re-affirmation did not send am
bassadors to Madrid (with the exception of SI Salvador).
There was no time limit in the resolution, nor was there
any stipulation that it had to be re-affirmed.

The

Polish delegate was probably correct in his contention
that it was still in force.

But the force of the re

solution was lessened considerably, and since the relilÆi.. 10»8
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fiolutioD in the first piece had been only a recommenda
tion, It now seemed lively that some nations would no
longer follow it.
The United States voted for the resolution us a whol<
after the section whieh would have re-affIrmed the Decem
ber 12 resolution had been rejected.

But it was evident

that the split between the Allies and the Soviet Union
had made the United States wary of voting for any meas
ures against Franco, and it was becoming bolder in its
efforts to protect this potential ally.

Whether the

forces of reaction were gathering their strength, as
the Soviet Union claimed, or whether a number of other
countries shared the United States view that the Soviet
Union was fast becoming a worse menace than Franco, the
niUBber of countries opposing the adoption of harsh meas
ures against Franco was increasing.

Would the members

of the United Natl one comply with the resolution of De
cember 18, 1946 after the General Assembly had refused
to re-affirm it?
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Chapter VI»

Franco gets a Pardon

In Koveahar, 1947, the United Nations failed to re
affirm the December 12, 1946, resolution recommending a
"break" in diplomatic relations with Franco Spain.

The

failure to re-affirm the resolution was taken by some of
the members to mean a revocation of It, and El Salvador
accredited a minister to Madrid*
As a result, a situation was created whieh put some
of the member nations which had not sent dlplcmatic rep^
resentatlves to Spain in a disadvantageous position, since
they had no representatives in Madrid to look after their
interests#

There were two main points of view on how to

remedy the situation.

One faction, led by the Soviet

Union, wanted to adopt a resolution strong enouj^ to leave
no doubt in the minde of the member states of the United
Nations as to what course they should pursue in regards to
Spain#

The other group, led by the United States, wanted

a resolution passed

the United Nations which would al

low the members themselves decide what relations they
should have with the Franco regime»
Both sides, as a result of this situation, wanted the
Spanish question to be re-introduced In the Ueneral Assem
bly#

It was re-introduced at the 140th Plenary Meeting,

on Septembei^ 84, 1948, by the Polish delegate, Lange, who
asked the ACsembly to remedy the situation in Spain by
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adopting a resolution strong enough to bring about the
collapse of the Franco regime*

The General Assembly re*

ferred the matter to the First Oommittee on Political and
Security Questions, along with all the previous resolutions
adopted by the United Nations on the Spanish question#
Because of a full agenda, the committee did not take
up the question until its 256th meeting on May 4, 1949#
Julnlsy Kats-Suchy of Poland introduced the problem by
reminding the members of the history of the Spanish ques
tion in the United Nations and reviewing the December 12,
1946, resolution recommending a recall of ambassadors and
ministers from Madrid#

He recapitulated the record of the

Franco regime and claimed that the United States and the
United Kingdom wanted Spain admitted to the United Nations.
The United States economic ascendency in Spain and the
military missions of the United States in Spain were cited
by the Polish delegate as examples of the attempt made by
^ e United States to sustain the Franco regime#

He quoted

several American newspaper articles which stated that the
United States should settle the Spanish question to Its
advantage#

The Washington Sunday Star, he said, stated

that the enemy was not Franco Spain but the U.S.S.R., and
!

that the latter should not be permitted to stop the United
States from settling the Spanish question to its own ad
vantage# and not as the Soviet Union dictated in the United
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Nations.^

i

Katz«*Sueh}r maintalnad that the United States was doing
everything in its power to have the December 18, 1946, res
olution revoked, and he pointed out that the United States
had re-established normal fInanelal relations with Franco
by unfreezing $69,000,000 worth of Spanish assets in the
United States.

He claimed that the attitude of the west

ern democracies was helping to keep Franco In power, and
he pleaded with the committee to follow its own conscience
and not the dictates of the United States.
questions to answer, he said.

There were two

(1) Had any of the basic

features of the Franco regime disappeared^

(8) Why had

the"United Nations failed to help the Spanish people set
up a democratic government and become eligible for member
ship?

He stated that the answer to both questions was that

the United Nations had been too weak in its dealings with
Spain, and he asked the Gosmittee to adopt a resolution
which would place the United Nations on the side of democ
racy and not fascism*
Jaoeo Oar 1 os liunniz of Brazil, arguing that the Decem
ber 12 resolution cabling for a "break" in diplomatic re
lations had not bey6 re-affirmed in 1947, said that some
— --------^ U n i t e d Nat j q # # (^jficial

WtJL* SftSSiEâft-SÊ' thmr.-rirat

the General Assem-

± , 1949. 2.
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of the members had taken this action to mean a revocation
of the resolution.

He submitted a draft resolution on the

behalf of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and his own country
which he hoped would remedy the situation.

The résolu»

tion read as follows:
The Ceneral Assembly,
Ooneidering that, during its second session in
1947, a proposal Intended to confirm the reso
lution of December 12, 1946, on the political
regime in power in Spain failed to obtain the
approval of two-thirds of the votes cast;
Considering that certain governments have in
terpreted the negative vote of 1947 as virt
ually revoking the clause in the previous reso
lution which recommended the withdrawal of heads
of mission with the rank of ambassador or minis
ter plenipotentiary accredited to the Spanish
Covernment;
Considering that, in view of the doubt regard
ing the validity of this interpretation, other
governments have continued to refrain from
accrediting heads of mission to Madrid, there
by creating inequality to their disadvantage;
Considering that such confusion may diminish
the prestige of the United Hâtions which all
Members of the Organization have a particular
interest in preserving;
Considering that in any event the 1946 reso
lution does not prescribe the breaking of
political and economic relations with the
Spanish Government which have been the sub
ject of bilateral agreements, are between the
governments of several Member States and the
Madrid Government;
Considering that in the negotiation of such
agreements, governments which have complied
with the recommendation of December 12, 1946,
are placed In a position of inequality which
works to the disadvantage of economically

94

weaker governments;
DBGIDES,,without prejudice to the declarations
contained In the resolution of December 12, 1946,
I to leave Member states full freedom of action as
regards their diplomatic relations with Spain*^
Uunnlz was supported in his contentions by the delej
:
gate from Pena, Belaunde, who also based hia argument on
..

'

-

the principle of non-intervention* But after contending
''i
that the December 12, 1946, resolution had been a failure,
Belaunde was assailed by the Polish delegate, who replied:
for the first time In the history of the United
Nations, a plea for fascism, murder and terror
has been heard. A Government which has the death
of thousands on its conscience has been praised
by the representative from Peru, who had not taken
any part in the war in which Franco Spain had
contributed to the sufferings of Europe.^
Belaunde protested against the accusation which the Polish
delegate had made.

In no way, he asserted, had Peru approv

ed of the Franco regime, but he asked:
'
could It not be retorted that millions of persons
have also perished as vlclms of Injustice in other
parts of the world?*
.r

'

The debate was waxing hot and heavy between these two
delegations when the meeting adjourned, and by the time the
committee reconvened on May 5, 1949, tempers had somewhat
cooled.

The first speaker at this meeting was Arbelaez of

g Ibid. . 649.
3 Ibid.. 177.
* Ibid.. 178.
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of Colombia who pleaded for the adoption of the join res
olution allowing the members freedom of action as far as
Spain was concerned on the grounds that the December 12,
1940, resolution constituted intervention in the domestic
affairs of Spain*
He was followed by the Polish delegate who announced
that he was going to introduce hie own resolution because
the joint resolution introduced by Brazil was much too
weak*

Lange claimed that his resolution would lead to

the overthrow of the Musaolini-Hltler-imposed government
in Spain*

He alleged that the joint resolution Introduced

by Brazil at long last brought out into the open the long
hidden desire to admit Franco Spain to the United Hâtions,^
Also, he expressed hope that the General Assembly vrould
adopt the Polish resolution which stated that:
The General Assembly;
Recommends that all members of the United Nations
should as a first step cease to export to Spain
arms and amunition as well as all warlike end
strategic material;
Recommends that all members of the United Nations
should refrain from entering into any agreements
or treaties with Franco Spain both formally and
de facto.'
Gromyko of the Soviet Union who spoke in favor of the
® ifeiis., 647.
® Ibid.. 648.
’ Ibid.. 649.
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Polish resolution, reealled that tho problem of relations
with Franco Spain had been under discussion since the
organization had been founded.

He reviewed the history

of the Spanish question and stated that it was owing to
the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom
that the Assembly*a resolution had not been Implemented
and that these two countries had only supported the 1946
resolution to satisfy public oplhlon*

He claimed that the

real attitude of these two governments now was quite dlf^
ferent and that the United States support of the Franco
Government was taking the form of political, economic, and
financial aid#

He recounted his version of United States**

Spanish financial relations after the war and accused the
Ihilted States of supporting France by sending raw materials
to Spain#®
Gromyko, In accusing the United States of bolstering
Its trade relations with Spain, also asserted that It was
a purpose of the United States government to utilize Spain
as a military base "In the war that Is being hatched against
the Union of Soviet Socialist R e p u b l i c s . G r o m y k o further
claimed that the policy of governing circles In the United
States and the United Kingdom was to support the Spanish
government and to encourage the fascist clique In Spain
® Ibid.. 197.
» Ibid.. 198.
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and Germany which slrcady were asking for admission to
the fwestern Suropean union** (North Atlantic Pact).

The

Soviet delegate believed that it was the Assembly *s re
sponsibility "to seek ways and means to re-establish de
mocracy in Spain so that the Spanish people might event
ually find a worthy place in the United

N a t i o n # ;

"^0

(This

was a departure from Soviet policy of the summer of 1946
when the Soviet Union believed that such was the responsi
bility of the Security Council*)
The other members of the Soviet bloc followed the same
line of argument, claiming that the Franco*regime was being
protected by the Anglo-American countries. Hoffmeister of
Useehoslovakia, Kislev of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, Tarasenko of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re
public, and Kats-Suchy of Poland all claimed that the United
States was plotting a war against the Soviet Union and that
the United States had concluded military and economic agree
ments with Spain as a part of this plot.

But while they

presented no proof of these contentions, they urged the
United Nations to do something about the Franco regime in
spite of the United States.
The Polish resolution was also supported by France and
Mexico, but their arguments differed from those of the
I b i a .. 801.
I b i d , . 238.
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Soviet Union.

Tbey were more prone to anti-Franco

preestir© In their home countries than most of the mem
bers.

Mexico was sensitive to public opinion, because

Mexico City wee the meeting place of and a haven for
the exiled Spanish Communist Party and the Republican
government.

Prance vas influenced by the strong, po

litically powerful labor unions In Prance which were
constantly pressing upon the government the necessity
of opposing the Franco regime.
The opposition to the Polish resolution was headed
by the United States and the United Kingdom delegates.
This opposition group believed that complete freedom of
action for the member states on the question of diplo
matic relations with Spain was of prime importance If
the prestige of the United Nations were to be saved.
This group Included Bolivie, Argentina, Ecuador, India,
The Netherlands, Domini can Republic, China, Peru, Colom12
bia, Sygpt, El Salvador, and Siam*
The delegates of
these states still based their opposition on the grounds
that the resolution of December 12 recommending a recall
of ministers from Spain had been a failure and that It
violated the established principles of non-intervention
contained in the Charter.

Ray Atherton of the United

States denied Soviet charges that the United States had
ifeld., 2se.
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concluded military agreements with Spain, but he did
not deny that dismantled equipment of German factories
was being shipped to Spain, 1 3
When Atherton had finished, the last speaker, Cas
tro of El Salvador, summed up the arguments against the
Polish resolution, stating that he was opposed to the
resolution because:
(1) The consequences of the proposal would be
especially prejudicial to the Spanish people;
(2) The proposal might encourage the Spanish
people to over throw their government, thus
causing more bloodshed in Spain;
(3) As there was no evidence of foreign inter
vention in Spain at that time the S|>ani8h
people were in a position to express their
desires as they had when they overthrew the
Monarchy and established the Republic;
(4) The collective pressure of the United Nations
to bring about a change of government in Spain
would constitute an intervention in the domes
tic affairs of a country, in violation of Art
icle 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter;
(5) The Polish proposal attempted to confirm reso
lution 39(1} of 1946, which envisaged the
application of coercive measures, would lead
the General Assembly to enroach on the powers
of the Security Council,*'
Castro was the last of the speakers, and the chair
man was able to bring the two proposals, the Polish and
the joint Latin-American, to a vote.

The Latin-Ameri-

can proposal was voted on first, and adopted by a vote
13

Ibid., 200.
Ibid., 238.
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of twenty-five to sixteen^ with sixteen abstentions.
16
Those states voting for the proposal were:
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Colombia
Domlnloan Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Bygpt
Greece
Honduras
Iraq
Lebanon
Liberia

Nicaragua
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Philippine Republic
Saudi Arabia
Slam
Syria
Turkey
Union of South Africa
Venezuela
Yemen

Those states voting against the resolution were:

1Ô

Australia
Panama
Byelorussian Soviet Social- Poland
1st Republic
Ukrainian Soviet SoclalCosta Rica
1st Republic
Czechoslovakia
Union of Soviet SoclalDenmark
1st Republics
Mexico
Uruguay
New Zealand
Yugoslavia
Norway
Those states abstaining were: 17
Afghanistan
Belgium
Burma
Canada
Chile
China
Prance

Haiti
Iceland
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

After the Latin-Amerloan resolution had been adopted* the
committee rejected the Polish resolution* thirty-one to
15

840

16

Ibid.. 240

17 Ibid.. 241
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eleven, with sixteen abstentions.
18
ing for the resolution were:

Those countries yot-

Byelorussian Soviet Social
ist Republic
Gzeohoslovakia
Franc e
Guatemala
Mexico
Poland
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Yugoslavia
Those states voting against the resolution were:
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
B1 Salvador
Bygpt
Greece
Honduras
Iceland
Iraq
Lebanon

Liberia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Sweden
Syria
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United Kingdom
United States

Those states abstaining were:
Afghanistan
Australia
Burma
Chile
Costa Rica
lÈiât, 241.
IfeiSl, , 241.
Ibid. , 240.

19

20

Cuba
BSâSiiopia
Haiti
India
Iran
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Hew Zealand
Philippine Republic
Saudi Arabia

Siam
Uruguay
Venezuela

From the First Committee^ the Latin-American reaolution was presented to
Assembly on May 11 ^ 1949. The
'Î
question was not opened for di sous si on at that time, but
the rapporteur.Salim Saiper of Turkey, read the resolu
tion* ^ On May 18, 1949, the Assembly discussed the reso
lution, and the delegates in

the Assembly expressedthe

same views on the Latin-American proposal
the Political Committee.

as they had

in

When the measure canw up for a

vote, the states grouped themselves as they had in the
committee, with twenty-six voting for the resolution,
fifteen against, and sixteen abstaining.

This vote had

been e n o u ^ to pass the resolution in the Political Com
mittee where only a simple majority vote was needed but
the resolution was defeated in the Assembly, because it
did not receive the votes of at least two-thirds of the
members (abstentions are counted as negative votes). Nev
ertheless, the fact that it received the votes of the ma
jority of the members of the United Nations was interpret
ed by many delegations to mean a revocation of the Decem81
ber 12, 1946 resolution.
Many members thought that this would be the end of
the Spanish question, but it was not.

On Tuesday, Septem-
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ber 19, 1950, the question of relations of member
states of the United Nations with Spain was placed on
the Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the
gg
Fifth Session.
It was placed on this list at the re
quest of the delegate of the Dominican Republic who
claimed that new evidence showed that the members of the
United Nations should have complete freedom of action
in regard to diplomatic relations with Spain.

This meant

that the question would come up for discussion before the
Ad Hoc Political Oomodttee.

This committee placed the

question on its agenda on October 88, 1950, and it was
discussed at six meetin%s.

The arguments for a change

in the December 12, 1946, resolution were the same as
they had always been.

They were best expressed by Secre

tary Acheson who clainmd that the withdrawal of ambassa
dors from Spain as a means of political pressure was a
departure from established principle.

He stated that it

was traditional practice, once a state was formally recogn
ized, to exchange ambassadors without political signifi
cance.

Said Ache8on:

At the Ninth International Oonference of American
States in Bogota, this principle was incorporated
in Resolution 35 which states in part that "the
establishment or maintenance of diplomatic rela
tions with a government does not imply any judge
ment upon the domestic policy of that government."
However, the withdrawal of ambassadors from Spain
go

"Supplementary Agenda of the Fifth Session",
Journal of the United Nations. September 19, 1950, 4.
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disregarded this principle. By attaching moral
significance to the refusal to maintain full dip
lomatic relations with Spain, this action has also
implied moral significance to the maintenance of
full diplomatic relations to confusion in public
opinion both here and abroad*
Public bewilderment
has been increased over the inconsistency of ac
crediting ambassadors to such countries as those
in Eastern Europe whose regimes we do not condone,
while at the same time refusing to appoint an am
bassador to Spain.
Other delegations were of the same opinion.

To accom

plish their goal (a change in the December 12, 1946, reso
lution) Bolivia, Qosta Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippine Republic,
and Peru submitted a draft resolution.
The Soviet bloc delegates opposed this resolution
for the same reasons they had opposed the joint LatinAmerican resolution of 1949, again accusing the United
States of protecting Franco and even of concluding mili
tary agreements with Spain.

This time the United States

delegation vigorously denied all Soviet charges. Pabregat
of Uruguay also disagreed with Acheson.

He announced

that he would not support the resolution, because if it
were passed by the General Assembly, Franco would count
"this approval as one of his greatest victories."
ss
"United States Policy toward Spain" Department
of State. Press Release. January 19, 1950, No. 64, 3.
24
United Natione Official Records of the General
Assembly. Summary records of the Ad Hoe Political C o m m i t tee. October 86, 1960, 3.
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A number of countries that gave their support to the
resolution (which was only one paragraph long, allowing
members of the United Nations full freedom of action in
regards to Spain) took Issue with the former United Na
tions action on the grounds that It had constituted an
intervention In the Internal affairs of a country.
pK
new resolution would rectify that mistake.

This

The resolution was put to a vote on November 1, 1950,
and the

Hoe Political Committee adopted the resolution

by roll call, thirty-seven to ten, with only the members
of the Russian bloc and Uruguay, Ghlle, Mexico, and France
voting against the resolution.

The resolution and the

Ad Hoc Political Committee's report were then read to
the General Assembly on November 4, 1950, by rapporteur
of the A^ Hoe Committee.

Rule sixty-seven of the General

Assembly allows the president to put to a vote the ques
tion "whether the General Assembly considers discussion
of the report to be necessary."

The president followed

this rule, and the Assembly decided that the report and
the resolution of the

Hoc Political Committee on the

Spanish question were not to be discussed, by thirtythree voted to five, with fifteen abstentions.
25

Ibid.. 1-8.
Ibid., 4.
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The resolution proposed by the Committee was then put
to a vote and adopted thirty-eight to ten, with twelve
abstentions.
Thus, the end came rather quietly, and when the Span
ish question appeared In the General Assembly for the last
time, the Assembly did not even feel that It was necessary
to discuss the recommendations of the Political Committee
as it had done so often before.

The working part of the

1946 resolution, or as it was officially known resolution
39(1), which in essence recommended that the members re
call their ministers and ambassadors from Madrid, was re
voked.
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Summation and Oonclusion

Every great war leaves many problems in its wake,
both to the victor and to the vanquished.

World War

II was no exception, and the Spanish question was one
of the most Important.

It can be called a problem left

by the war, because before Hitler invaded Poland, there
was little evidence of any concern expressed by the gov
ernments of the United States or the United Kingdom
whether Franco ruled Spain or not.

The United Kingdom,

along with France, previously had destroyed all attempts
by the Spanish Republican government to solicit aid from
,

; ;

the League of Nations during the Spanish Civil War.

Brit

ish ships of the International Naval Patrol, perhaps as
the Republican government claimed, had been blinded by
the "dense fog of their own stacks" and allowed Mussolini
to apply his own interpretation of the Leagues "Withdraw
al Plan," an interpretation which had involved the gather
ing of the Italian sick from Franco's armies, marching
them past the League of Nations "counters," shipping them
to Naples, and then shipping fresh troops back overseas
to Spanish battlefields.

(In 1938 Italy had 110,000 men

in Spain, according to the League of Nations "counters"
between 30,000 and 40,000 Italians "most of them sickly"
had withdrawn, yet in 1939 after the fall of Madrid, there
were,still over 100;000 Italians in Spain.)
The United State:; government, undaunted by public opin-
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Ion, as expressed In resolutions of labor unions, church
councils and liberal associations, had contributed to
the Franco cause by refusing to recognize either side as
a belligerent and by proclaiming the ^Neutrality Act" of
1937 which worked to the advantage of the rebel govern
ment.

This neutrality act had allowed either side to

operate on a "cash and carry" basis, and as Franco con
trolled most of the ports of entry the Republican govern
ment largely had been cut off from American supplies.
Soviet Russia which, for its own purposes and not
from any altrusitic motivation and apparently to thwart
German and Italian ambition in Spain, had given its sup
port to the Popular Front government, a government which
at the start of the war had not one Communist cabinet
member but which was decidedly under the Communist banner
at the and of the war.

(Soviet Russia had stipulated

that all quartermaster corps and all logistic corps had
to be under the orders of a communist party member, or
no more aid would be shipped from the Soviet Union.

There

fore, the communists were able completely to control the
Republican government in Spain.)
However, Russian aid had come too late and had been
insignificant compared to the men and materials sent by
Germany and Italy.

Franco thus owed a debt to Hitler

for his victory in the Civil War, and Hitler tried to
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build this debt Into a wartime alliance•

Prom the ma

terial submitted by the member states and the Investigat
ing committees of the United Nations, there can be little
doubt that Hitler succeeded In creating this alliance.
(Franco admitted that Spain was a member of the Axis, and
Spain had concluded several agreements with Germany that
seemed to put Franco on the Axis s i d e . T h e r e

la a

great deal of evidence to support the contention that
Franco was an active member of the conspiracy to wage
war against the group of countries now known as the Unit
ed Nations.

(For Instance Franco had seized Tangier In

1940 In violation of international statute and had en
gaged with Germany In planning and training for the joint
g
conquest of Gibraltar.)
According to the sub-committee
of the Security Council, which quoted from telegrams of
Franco to Hitler, It was part of the plot that Spain
3
should enter the war at the most opportune time.
The group of nations, now known as the United Na
tions, alternately has built up and destroyed a strong
United Nations Official Records of the Security
Council. Report or the Special Sub-Committee on the Span
ish Question. 4. (qdoted from a report submitted to the
sub-committee from t^ie United States Intelligence Service)
^ Ihld., 1-30. (quoted from captured German war docu
ments submitted by the Allies).
^ Ibid. , 8.
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oese against the Franco regime.

This ease created by

the United Nations contained sections which were very
strong legally and sections which seemed to have no
substantiation whatsoever In International law.
The Spanish question was one of the first questions
to be considered by the United Nations.

The Panama reso

lution, recommending that the members of the United Na
tions use the Potsdam declaration as a guide for their
future diplomatic relations with Spain was perfectly
compatible with the provisions of the Charter, for it
merely excluded Franco Spain frc»a admission to the Unit
ed Nations.

The United Nations can exclude any nation

which does not, in its judgement, possess the necessary
qualifications for membership.
The adoption of the Panama resolution proved that the
western Allies and the Soviet Union were still on fairly
good terms in 1945 and that they were in perfect accord
about one thing in 1946: that Franco Spain should not be
come a member of the United Nations.

Soviet Russia, how

ever, wanted to do more than merely denounce the Spanish
government.

But, as the Spanish Embassy claimed, "along

came Anglo-American caution," and the Issue was postponed.
Because the Allies were afraid of precipitating another
^ "Wheels Within Wheels", Diplomatic Information
Office of Spain. Spanish Embassy, 1946, 16.

4

Ill

elvil war In Spain» they contented themselves with a
verbal condemnation of the Franco regime.

In the summer of 1946» the Spanish question was in
troduced in the Security Council by a member of the Soviet
bloc.

Oscar Lange of Poland requested the Security Coun

cil to examine the situation in Spain under the authority
of Article S» paragraph 6, of the Charter of the United
Nations which provides that the United Nations shall in
sure that states not members of the United Nations shall
act in accordance with the principles of the organization.
It is not clear what the legal position of this section
of the Charter is under the principles of international
law.

One line of reasoning seems to establish that this

paragraph of the Charter does not conform to the estab
lished principles of international law» because the Char
ter» in reality a multi-lateral treaty, binds» like other
treaties» the signatory parties.
The Security Council did not question the jurisdic
tion of the United Nations under the interpretation of
Article S.

But it did express a doubt as to whether the

United Nations had a legal right to pass a resolution
calling for measures similar to those asked for in the
Polish resolution.

Some delegates believed that United

Nations action on the situation in Spain would consti
tute intervention in a matter essentially domestic, and
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the Charter forblcle aetion by the United Nations on any
subject within the jurisdiction of an individual state.
(It is the opinion of this writer that the basic failure
of the United Nations to correct the situation in Spain
is to be found in this article.

The makers of the Char

ter, in over a hundred articles, gave the new organiza
tion defined powers and then took them all away with this
single paragraph.)
In the case of the Polish resolution, jurisdiction
was sought under the authority of Articles 34 and 36
which allow the Security Council to deal with any situa
tion threatening international security.

The Special

Sub-Committee appointed by the Security Council to ex
amine the Spanish situation found that the situation in
Spain was "a situation the continuance of which might
threaten the maintenance of international peace."

There

fore, the sub-committee decided that the Security Coun
cil could claim some jurisdiction over the Spanisdi ques
tion.

However, the sub-committee held that the measures

called for in the Polish resolution under the authority
of Articles 40 and 41 would not be legal, since the Franco
regime at the moment of proposed action was not a threat
to international peace.

The sub-committee, therefore,

proposed that the Security Council refer the question to
the General Assembly, along with the report of the sub
committee.

It was believed by the majority of the members
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of the Security Council that aince the aub-comalttee
proposal recommended the recall of the heads of the
diplomatic missions In Madrid, all of the members of the
United Nations should have a chance to express their opin
ion of the proposed action.
The Polish resolution was amended and revised by the
Security Council until almost nothing remained of the origlnal proposal.

As a result, the only two countries

that did not vote for the resolution were Poland end the
Soviet Union, and the measure was not adopted.

These two

eoimtries, Poland and the Soviet Union, were afraid that
the Ceneral Assembly in acting on the question would gain
in prestige and power to the detriment of the Security
Council.

The Soviet Union wanted the Security Council

to make every important decision, because it was possible
to control the decisions of the Security Council through
the use of the veto.

The Soviet Union was not afraid

that the Ceneral Assembly would pass a resolution favor
able to the Franco regime, but that In passing such a
resolution a precedent would be set which at some later
time might work to the disadvantage of Soviet interests.
However, the Polish delegation later Introduced the
very measure which enabled the Security Council to delete
the question from the list of matters It had under obser
vation, thus making It possible for the General Assembly
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to place the Spanish question on Its agenda.

The Soviet

Union had decided that the Security Council would never
settle the Spanish question to Soviet satisfaction.

Ap

parently the Soviet Union hoped that the possible loss
of power by the Security Council would be more than com
pensated for by United Nations action In the General
Assembly leading to the fall of the Franco regime.
The polish delegation led the attack on Franco Spain
In the Political Committee of the General Assembly, to
which It was referred by the Assembly.

Poland was a mem

ber of the special sub*^comalttee which drafted the wellknown resolution 39(1) of December IS, 1946.

This reso

lution recommended that the members of the United Nations
recall from Madrid their accredited ambassadors and minis
ters.

It also recommended that Franco Spain be excluded

from membership In all the specialized agencies set up
by the United Nations.
When some of the delegations referred to resolution
39(1), they commonly Interpreted It as calling for a
break In diplomatic relations with Spain.
false assumption.

This was a

In reocmmendlng that the heads of the

diplomatic missions to Spain be recalled, the resolution
In no way disrupted the flow of business between the Span
ish government and the various embassies.
affair" was proof of this contention.

The

McMahon

It was conducted
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In its entirety* without the presence of an American
ambassador* by a chargé d'affaires*^
This resolution, 39(1), was followed completely by
the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

But It

is possible that the exclusion of Franco Spain from such
agencies as the International Givil Aviation Organization
and the World Health Organization placed undue hardship
on the Spanish people and did no material harm to the Franco
regime*

It was argued that the resolution as a whole enabled

Franco to unite the Spanish people behind him*

Franco was

able, apparently, to eonvinde many Spaniards who had prev
iously been opposed to him that Resolution 39(1) recommend
ed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain.
The weakness of the resolution, then, was that it did
^ The Spanish government withdrew press credentials
from Dr* Francis KcMahon, a correspondent In Spain for the
New York Post* The Spanish foreign minister wrote a note
(April 14^ 1947) stating that the only reason Dr* NcNkihon
had been permitted to enter Spain in the first place was
because the American Bmbassy had intervened in his favor.
He also claimed that during the six months Dr. McMahon had
been in Spain he had enjoyed full and complete freedom to
circulate throughout Spanish territory and to send in his
articles without hindrance. Mr* Phillip Bonsai, the United
States cheu*gé d'affaires in Madrid, answered the letter on
April 28, 1947, and expressed his regret that the Spanish
government had acted the way it had* He also stated that
this action by the Spanish government constituted a revo
cation of the polfcy of granting to foreign correspondents
freedom from control and censorship. The Spanish govern
ment reconsidered its action, and fuller freedom was grant
ed to correspondents in Spain.
United
litf 1 I

lelease No. 372 of
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no't go far enough*

The members of the United Nations

(except the Soviet bloc) hesitated to take more drastic
aetion for fear of bringing to the Spanish people the hard
ships of another civil war*

Also, apparently, the fear of

the western Allies that a change in the Spanish government
would give the communists a chance to seize power in Spain
caused them to support the Franco regime.

A western world,

perhaps soon to be at war with the Soviet Union could not
afford to have the strategic Iberian Peninsula in unsympa
thetic hands.®

Again (as during the Spanish civil war) the

two governments were opposed to harsh action.

They pre*

ferred to pursue a gentler course with Franco, to try to
persuade him to adopt democratic methods and institutions
as would enable Spain eventually to become a member of the
United Nations.
Despite the opposition of some of the members of the
United Nations to the resolution 39(1) recommending a re
call of ambassadors from Madrid, once the resolution had
been adopted, the United Nations did comply with the res
olution with the exception of ArgAntina.^

Nevertheless,

® Ghurehill has pointed out that whoever controls Spain
controls the Straits as the importance of Ulbraltar and all
"pinpoint” bases was decreased with the easy fall of Sing
apore. The strength tpdajT Is in depth, and if Bur ope were
overrun, the Pyrenees Would be the last barrier*
^ At least no nation (except Argentina) accredited a
new ambassador to Spain.
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m#r# anti mar# of th« membara oppoaad tba raoalllng of
«hoir amhaaoadiw# and mlnlatora.

World avant a wera oaua~

ing tha amallar atotoo to awing into tha woatarn orbit,
snail atataa traditionally oaoillata from ono aida to tha
othar in an international organisation where no neutral
ity i# poaaibla on a vota taken on an important maaaura.
During thia **anarganoy,** tha agwll powara, noting tha
woraaning of raleticm» batwaan tha Soviet Union and tha
United State», ahoaa tha United State», probably an tha
laaear of two evil».

(In 19S0, after the attook on South

Korea, ten of the aamll powers ahangad their opinions on
tha Spanish question to eonforot to the view held by tha
United States.)
Am a result of the growing opposition to the resell

resolution, when tha sponsors of the resolution attempted
to have it re-affirmed in 1947, the majority of tha mem
bers of tha Uanarml Assembly voted for a proposal witioh if
it had bean adopted would have abrogated the oonditions of
tha re sail resolution.

Although the measure reoaivad tha

majority of the votes oast, it did not reoeive th* neaessary two*thirds to oarry it.

Nevertheless, beoause tha

majority of the members of the Assembly had favored full
freedom of notion in regard to diplomatie relations wich
Spain, many of the members ware of the opinion that the
resail resolution of 194d had been annulled.
However, aeaording to the rules and prooadura of the
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General Assembly, the legal status of the recall reso
lution was quite clear.

It remained In force, since no

direct action was tfiKen to repeal It.

The situation after

this failure to re-affirm the resolution In 1947 left some
of the members of the United Nations In an awkward position.
The members of the United Ration® which had recalled their
ambassadors from Madrid were left without an official to
represent them at state functions, causing

0

loss of pres

tige*
In 1949, an attempt was made to remedy this situation
by adopting a resolution,

celled the LatIn-Amerlean reso

lution, to permit members of the United Nations full dip
lomatic freedom with Spain.

But the measure failed to

receive the necessary two-thirds vote and was not adopted.
Sven so, this resolution showed that the "conservative**
states (conservative in regard to action against Spain)
were gaining in strength.

It seemed to be only a matter

of time until the recall resolution would be revoked.
This assumption was correct, end when the Ad Hoc P o 
litical Committee examined the Spfnlsh question In 1950,
the members of ^he committee adopted e resolution recom
mending that the members of the United Rations be allowed
full freedom of action toward Spain.

Then the committee

presented its reBolut"*ion to the General Assembly,

It was

not even discussed but was quickly adopted by a roll call
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vote*
Ae e result, the United Nations attitude toward Spain
in 1950 rae similar to its attitude toward Spain in 1946*
In 1960, as in 1946, the offleial policy of the United
Nations prohibited Franco Spain from becoming a member of
the United Nations and has condemned the Franco regime,
but has done absolutely nothing more to correct the situ
ation in Spain*

(The revocation of the 1946 resolution

in October, 1960, ml#it even be termed as an "epology" to
the Franco regime, or as the delegate f rom Poland said,
"one of his greatest victories.")
In reviewing the Spanish question before the United
Nations, several questions present themselves*

Did the

United Nations pursue a legal course of ection in hand
ling the Spanish question?

The answer seems to be no.

By the terms of the Charter (Article 2, paragraph 7, which
states that all members of the United Nations must refrain
from interfering in matters that are essentially within
thé»domestic control of a state,) its course of action
was not legal.

According to Webster, who provides the

simplest definition of international intervention:
an intervention is the interference of e. state
in the affairs of another state for the purpose
of compelling the state to forbear doing certain
acts or altering the conditions of its domestic
affaire irrespejctlve of its will.
This is what the United Nations, or at least some pf the

1^0

members, wanted to do; to alter the condition of S p a i n ’s
domestic affairs Irrespective of S p a i n ’s will*

And be 

cause the Charter forbids the United Nations to intervene,
the measures tried by the United Nations seem to have been
Illegal.
It was argued by some of the supporters of the United
Nations action that practical considerations forced the
United Nations to Interpret the Charter in a different
way.

They have argued that the activities of the Franco

regime created a threat to international peade, and there
fore any action necessary to remedy the situation was legal
according to the Charter.

This contention would have been

true If the activities of the Franco regime did create a
threat to the peace, for the primary purpose of the United
Nations Is to preserve the peace, and the Security Council
may take any measures It considers necessary to preserve
this peace.

However, upon reconsideration,

it is found

that this premise is not true ; the United Nations own "in
vestigation, " by Its special sub-committee, found that the
situation in Hpain did not create a threat to international
peace.

Therefore, the United Nations could not take any

action to remedy the situation in Spain.
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jurtlGlas In parlodioala wera eapaeially helpful
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ZazssssiEa.
A*
^
Born in 1907 near Chevnigov.

^ ^
.
Educated at the University
of Dnlepropetrovsk and Kiev. Served in the Army 41-43;
Counselor to Soviet Embassy in Washington 46-48; the
permanent representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socli.list
Republic to the United Nations since 1947.
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zbszLâ, m m .
Born 1903 at Beykjovlck.
Hduoatodb at Cambridge.
Counsel
or to legation in Kew York 40-41, Minister to United States
from Iceland 41-; permanent representative of leeland to
the United Nations since 194Ô*
Velloao.
No available information*
Zuloaa^. P e ^ Q .
Sorn in 1890 at Caracas. Educated at the University of
Venezuela, Harvard, Paris Law School; Secretary-General
of Venezuela’s World Exposition Section 27; representative
of Venezuela to the United Nations since 1947.

